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iABSTRACT
Despite the profound impacts of HIV and AIDS on all sectors of South African society, 
governmental responses to the AIDS epidemic have been inundated with contradiction, conflict 
and contestation.  Though governmental leaders have justified not funding HIV treatment 
programs because they believe that poverty needs to be dealt with first, social spending has been 
slashed as part of an adherence to a neo-liberal economic model.  Though it would seem that the 
government would seem to have everything to gain by establishing a cooperative relationship 
with non-governmental actors regarding the epidemic, the relationship between the government 
and non-governmental actors has instead been described as nothing short of hostile.  Though the 
government enthusiastically backed Virodene, a supposed treatment for AIDS that turned out to 
be no more than an industrial solvent, other ‘scientifically backed’ AIDS treatments have been 
treated with caution and skepticism – to the point where the government even refused to provide 
funding for programs to prevent mother to child transmission of the virus.  And perhaps the most 
perplexing is that although widely respected for his intellect and cool demeanor, former 
President Mbeki chose to risk his political career on the AIDS issue by shunning away from the 
mainstream consensus on the biomedical causes of the epidemic and instead surrounded himself 
and sought advice from AIDS ‘dissidents’
This thesis will seek explanations for these apparent contradictions.  Using Bourdieu’s 
(1986) typology of capitals, it will build on an argument put forward by Helen Schneider (2002): 
from the South African government’s perspective, the contestation regarding HIV and AIDS 
policy and implementation is over symbolic capital, or the right to legitimately hold and exercise 
political power regarding the epidemic.  Though this argument helps explain the conflictual 
relationship between the government and non-governmental actors regarding the AIDS crisis, in 
order to understand the perplexing contradictions within the governmental policy response, the 
political context of policy formation must first be taken into consideration.
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1Chapter 1 – Introduction
The South African AIDS Epidemic
The scale of South Africa’s HIV AND AIDS pandemic would be overwhelming to any 
government.  The first HIV case in South Africa was identified in 1982.  By 1990, the first 
annual national survey in antenatal clinics found an HIV prevalence rate of 0.8% among 
pregnant women.  The next year, that figure had doubled to 1.5%, and it was clear that South 
Africa was in the early stages of a serious AIDS epidemic1.  The World Health Organization 
(WHO) 2003 estimate for adult prevalence of AIDS in South Africa was between 17.8-24.3%2, 
with among the highest number of infected people in the world.  The enormous impact of the 
spread of HIV and AIDS across sub-Saharan Africa has been said to be one of the greatest 
humanitarian crises of our time, and South Africa is home to over 5 million of the estimated 40 
million people in the world who are infected with HIV3.  The immensity of the situation has 
forced its way to the forefront of attention of national governments, international organisations 
and civil society across the globe.  
South Africa contributes almost half of the total economic output of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
and in theory has the financial resources to provide universal accessibility to HIV prevention, 
care and support4.  Its tertiary health system is renowned for such achievements as pioneering the 
world’s first heart transplant and contributing significant knowledge to the understanding of 
severe child malnutrition5.  However, its health and other social indicators are discrepantly poor 
compared to other middle income countries (see 
                                                          
1 Schneider, Helen, and Joanne Stein. "Implementing AIDS policy in post-Apartheid South Africa." Social Science 
and Medicine 52 (2001): 723-731.
2 WHO. "Summary Country Profile for HIV/AIDS Treatment Scale-up: South Africa." World Health Organization.
June 2005. http://www.who.int/3by5/support/june2005_zaf.pdf.
3 Benatar, Solomon. "Health Care Reform and the Crisis of HIV and AIDS in South Africa." The New England 
Journal of Medicine, 2004: 81-92.
4 Johnson, Krista. "The Politics of AIDS Policy Development and Implementation in Post-Apartheid South Africa." 
Africa Today 51, no. 2 (2004): 107-128.
5 Sanders, David, and Mickey Chopra. "Key Challenges to Achieving Health for All in an Inequitable Society." 
American Journal of Public Health 90, no. 1 (2006): 73-78.
2Table 1 'Comparison of Five Middle Income Countries').  Although it has some of the top 
medical facilities in the entire world, 80% of its population has limited access to health care.  
Though it is often touted as the “leader of Africa” and is often one of the first nations to respond 
to disasters and troubles (political and otherwise) that arise within the African continent, 
arguably the most significant problem facing its own population – the HIV and AIDS epidemic –
has gone essentially unchecked.  It is estimated that between 40 and 50 percent of the South 
African workforce could die within the next decade as a result of AIDS6.
Given the rather desperate situation in South Africa, it is incredibly perplexing that the 
state’s AIDS policies7 have been described at best as schizophrenic8.  The South African 
government has been widely criticised both domestically and internationally for the approach it 
has taken in addressing HIV and AIDS.  President Mbeki’s questioning of the biomedical causes 
of AIDS has in large part baffled both national and international audiences inside and outside of 
the medical fields, and governmental decisions  to deny funding for treatment programmes such 
as the Mother to Child Treatment Prevention programme have drawn wide criticism from non-
governmental organisations committed to human rights.  The HIV and AIDS policies put 
forward by both the presidential office and the Department of Health have been shrouded in 
scandal and criticised widely for prevarication and overall confusion9.  In short, the overall 
governmental response to HIV and AIDS in South Africa has been widely characterised as 
delayed and insufficient.  Even the policies that have been drafted meticulously have been 
derailed and generally implemented poorly, with the result that the South African government 
has been unable to realise any sort of strategic plan that would substantially reduce the risk of 
transmitting HIV or dying from AIDS-related illnesses10.  
                                                          
6 Benatar, “Health Care Reform”.
7 Though ‘AIDS policy’ will often be referred to, it is with the understanding that HIV is the virus that causes AIDS, 
and that unless otherwise stated, AIDS Policy is seeking to address those who are at risk of contracting HIV, have 
already contracted HIV, and those who have reached the immunodeficiency level low enough to be categorized as 
having ‘AIDS’.
8 Youde, Jeremy R. AIDS, South Africa, and the Politics of Knowledge. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 
2007: 2.
9 Butler, Anthony. "South Africa's HIV/AIDS Policy, 1994-2004: How can it be explained?" African Affairs 104, no. 
417 (2005): 591-614.
10 Ibid.
3Within the South African context, there is general consensus that there has been a ‘crisis 
of implementation’ surrounding AIDS policies since the epidemic was first identified.  The 
reasons for the failure of these policies, however, have far less of a consensus, and there is wide 
variation in the reasons put forward within the literature.  For example, among literature in the 
field, there is fairly wide disagreement among over how much the role of the political elite has 
played into the perpetuation of AIDS prevalence.  Authors such as Robins (2004) place heavy 
emphasis on the importance of cultural politics issues such as President Mbeki’s pro-dissident 
stance on HIV.  According to Robins and like-minded authors, President Mbeki and his “inner 
circle” have directly undermined public health institutions and contributed to the deaths of tens 
of thousands of people.  However, authors like Hunter (2007) argue that although President 
Mbeki has been widely criticised for his stance on AIDS, his politics have actually played a 
minimal role in exacerbating the scale of the AIDS epidemic, and that the leader’s role in 
implementing (or not implementing) AIDS policy has actually been minimal.  Other examples of 
reasons put forward for the failure of policy implementation within South Africa are outlined by 
Schneider and Stein (2001), Schneider (2004), Johnson (2004), and van Niekerk (2003).   These 
reasons include: the continual restructuring of the government on all levels caused by the 
transition to democracy, institutional constraints due to the legacy of Apartheid that have limited 
access and funding for health care within the country, adherence to neoliberal economic policies 
which has resulted in increased social and economic inequalities, and an ideological stalemate 
between prevention and treatment campaigns.  
Why Policy is Important: Historical Context and Lessons Apartheid
It is estimated by the World Health Organization that between one out of every 4 or 5 
South Africans is HIV positive11.  The resulting social and economic burdens of this type of 
statistic would be colossally difficult for any state to deal with, regardless of political stability.  
Compound all of this with the fact that South Africa is still in the midst of a massive upheaval 
from the dissolution of the Apartheid state and transition into democracy, and it is not hard to see 
that the challenge presented to the government by the epidemic is tremendous.  
                                                          
11 WHO, “Country Profile for HIV/AIDS”.
4The most significant factor that distinguishes South Africa from other African nations12 is 
its unique experience of Apartheid13.  The policies associated with the Apartheid-era have been 
particularly relevant to facilitating the spread of HIV and AIDS in contemporary South Africa14.  
Not the least of these was the vast displacement of people from urban to rural areas.  The 
political domination and racial segregation of the indigenous people of South Africa began 
shortly after the colonization of the Cape of Good Hope in 1652, but became formally 
entrenched in 1948, when the white minority Nationalist Party gained full political control, 
despite the fact that over 80% of the population of South Africa consisted of black indigenous 
Africans.  The Nationalist Party implemented the policies of Apartheid – or racial separateness –
that lasted until South Africa’s first democratic elections in 199415.  During the era of Apartheid, 
over four million Black, Coloured and Indian people were removed from their homes in urban 
areas and moved into rural areas designated as “homelands”  Additionally, there were forced 
removals within the urban areas – in the major metropolitan areas, hundreds of thousands of 
people were displaced from the centers of towns to the peripheries.  The result of this was the 
creation of a huge population of people who lived in barren rural areas or in overcrowded areas 
outside of cities.  The conditions in these places were often not even conducive to a subsistence 
existence.  Additionally, in line with Apartheid policy, these areas were often devoid of health 
and education services16.
In addition to the forced displacement of the majority of the population, the negative 
effects of Apartheid policies were intensified by the effects of a migratory work system that was 
created to serve the mining industry.  With the discovery of mineral wealth, international 
proprietors and foreign capital poured into South Africa to exploit the mineral resources.  This 
greatly disrupted the pastoral societies of both the indigenous Africans and Afrikaner famers.  
                                                          
12 Other than Namibia.
13Aliber, Michael. "Chronic Poverty in South Africa: Incidence, Causes and Policy." World Development, 2003: 
473-490.
14Sachs, Jonny. "South Africa as the Epicenter of HIV/AIDS: Vital POlitical Legacies and Current Debates." 
Current Issues in Comparative Education 3, no. 1 (2002): 52-56.
15 Van Niekerk, Robert. "The Evolution of Health and Welfare Policies in South Africa: Inherited Institutions, 
Fiscal Restraint, and the Deracialization of Social Policy in the Post-Apartheid Era." The Journal of African 
American History 88, no. 4 (2003): 361-376.
16 Sachs, South Africa as Epicenter”.
5The mining industry demanded a workforce, and in addition to luring Europeans to the area, 
mining tycoons needed to transform the indigenous men, most of whom were previously 
subsistence farmers, into labourers.  The tycoons used strategies such as imposing hut and poll 
taxes and introducing the desire for manufactured products in order to persuade and coerce the 
indigenous population to enter into a monetary economy.  Additionally, male black workers were 
brought in from the homelands to work in the mines.  Once pulled into the system, the new 
underground mine labourers were induced to live for year-long stints in male-only compounds17.  
The need for labour, compounded with the displacement of large populations of people into 
‘homelands’ created a system of migrant labour which was a defining element of the Apartheid
system.  
The system of migrant labor set the scene for the rampant spread of sexually transmitted 
diseases and infections in South Africa.  Black mine workers were required to work under the 
terms of the pass laws, and were only allowed to visit, and not live, with their families.  Very few 
black women were able to find work, but those who did usually served in the homes of white 
families, and a few subsisted by becoming sex workers in the mine compounds.  The migrant 
patterns of the men led to large amounts of prostitution and men having multiple sexual 
partners18.  In a much quoted paper on the social pathology of syphilis, Sidney Kark (1949) first 
put forward the dismaying data that showed how epidemic sexual disease was spread along the 
routes of migrant labor – from the cities back to the rural reserve areas.  
The spread of sexually transmitted diseases was not the only detrimental effect of 
Apartheid policies on health, however.  Another way to view the effects of the policies is to look 
at the outcomes on the health indicators of the population.  During the 1970s, 1980s and early 
1990s, while South Africa’s system was legally segregated, the health and development of the 
‘black’, ‘coloured’ and Indian citizens were completely different experiences than the health and 
development for the ‘white’ populations.  There were intense contrasts in the health of the 
different populations.  As Leonard Thompson indicates in his book about the history of South 
Africa, white South Africans, much like Western Europeans or North Americans, experienced 
both a long life expectancy and a low infant mortality rate (64.5 years for males and 72.3 years 
                                                          
17 Abdool Karim, Quarraisha, and Salim S. Abdool Karim. "The evolving HIV epidemic in South Africa." 
International Journal of Epidemiology 31 (2002): 37-40.
18 Ibid.
6for females in 1969-71, and 14.0 per thousand live births in 1978 respectively).  The most 
commonly occurring diseases were in sync with those of industrialised nations, and they had 
access to some of the highest standards in health care around the world19.  
Meanwhile, the experience for black South Africans was entirely different.  During the 
1970s, the unemployment rates for black South Africans increased dramatically, almost doubling 
from ½ million to 2.3 million between 1960 and 197720.  Consequently, black South Africans 
experienced high levels of poverty, under-nutrition, and disease. Though the government did not 
keep reliable medical statistics for black South Africans during Apartheid, the estimates are 
alarming.  Official estimates for life expectancy were 51.2 for males and 58.9 for females in 
1965-1970, and these are most certainly overestimates.  Child mortality rates for both black and 
coloured 1-4 year olds were thirteen times as high as for whites, and the main cause of such 
drastic child mortality rates was inadequate nutrition.  Also notable, the primary diseases that led 
to death for black South Africans were pneumonia, gastroenteritis, and tuberculosis, the same 
diseases that are most common in the ‘third world’21.  Essentially, within the same nation, 
different populations were experiencing different stages of the epidemiological transition22 from 
‘third world’ to ‘first world’.
More current statistics are perhaps even more depressing.  Consistent with the 
understanding that the affluent sections of the population of South Africa have completed the 
epidemiological transition, while economically disadvantaged sections of the population 
continue to suffer under the burden of pre-transitional pathologies, the poor of South Africa are 
                                                          
19 Thompson, Leonard. A History of South Africa: Third Edition. NewHaven and London: Yale Universtiy, 2001.
Statistics quoted by Thompson are taken from the South African Survey 1999-2000.
20 As estimated by South African economist Charles Simkins in Thompson, A History of Africa.
21  Thompson, A History of Africa.
22 Omran, Abdel. "The Epidemiologic Transition: A Theory of the Epidemiology of Population Change." The 
Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly 49, no. 4 (1971): 509-538.  Originally proposed by Omran (1971), 
“epidemiological transition” refers to a shift in the pattern of the causes of mortality within a particular society or 
country to shift from infectious diseases toward more degenerative diseases.  Normally, the epidemiological 
transition occurs during the process of economic modernization or development within a country, as advances are 
made in the health care system.  In today’s world, less developed countries are assumed to have higher rates of 
mortality due to infectious diseases (usually due to a lower level of available health care).  In turn, there is an 
assumption that in more developed countries, more people die from degenerative diseases (such as heart disease or 
cancer) since infectious diseases (malaria, cholera, typhoid, and so on) are easily treated within the context of their 
more developed health care systems.  In South Africa, because of the high levels of socio-economic inequality, 
different populations have different access to health care, education and resources, causing the population to be at 
different levels of the epidemiological transition.
7disproportionately affected by infectious and sexually-transmitted disease, most namely HIV and 
AIDS.  The patterns of morbidity and mortality are shaped by persistent and severe inequalities 
in the major risk factors such as rates of malnutrition (stunting rates are six times higher in those 
within the poorest quintile compared with those in the richest quintile)23.  
The health outcomes shaped by Apartheid policies have led authors such as Marks (2002) 
to claim that the AIDS epidemic was ‘waiting to happen’ in South Africa.  This argument is 
based on the idea that prior to the onset of the AIDS pandemic, the social and political 
environment of South Africa was set up in such a way that it only took a small spark to ignite the 
outbreak of the epidemic.  This type of environment has been called a ‘high risk situation’ which
is defined by such indicators as “impoverishment and disenfranchisement, rapid urbanization, the 
anonymity of urban life, labour migration, widespread population movements and displacements, 
social disruption and wars, especially counter-insurgency wars24”.  In ‘high risk situations’ such 
as these, where the focus is on daily survival (or daily survival is dangerous) and social bonds are 
low or broken, risk taking (especially sexually) is much more likely and gender relations are 
usually highly unequal.  Additionally, in situations such as these, it is more likely that 
transactional sex, drug use, alcohol misuse and other high risk behavior will take place, which 
sets up the probability that if a sexually transmittable disease is introduced, it will spread rapidly 
and widely.
This is seemingly exactly what happened in South Africa.  When HIV was first 
discovered in South Africa in 1982, the scene was set – in addition to the sweeping political 
changes and enormous, accumulated wealth existing side by side with abject poverty, the conflict 
and ‘low-intensity’ warfare taking place within its borders added to a very unstable social 
situation.  The black population was experiencing essentially every one of the ‘high risk’ 
indicators listed above.  It would be nearly impossible to understand the implications and 
progression of the AIDS epidemic in South Africa without giving attention to the very specific 
historical context in which it occurred.  The lessons from Apartheid are important reminders that 
governmental policies and priorities can directly affect the health outcomes of its populations.  
                                                          
23  Sanders and Chopra, “Key Challenges”.
24 Marks, Shula. "An Epidemic Waiting to Happen? The Spread of HIV/AIDS in South Afirca in SOcial and 
Historical Perspective." African Studies 61, no. 1 (2002): 13-26.
8Why Policies Matter: Post-Apartheid Policy-making
The racist policies of Apartheid set the scene perfectly for a ‘high risk situation.’  Until 
the late 1980s, Apartheid policies institutionalised inequalities through labour laws and highly 
unequal investment in social services for different racial groups.  Because of this, the current 
health situation within South Africa is often directly linked to Apartheid-era policies.  However, 
upon closer examination, it becomes apparent that the ‘blame’ for the scale of the epidemic 
cannot end there.  Simply pointing fingers towards the past does not explain why, fifteen years 
later, the socio-economic patterns institutionalised under Apartheid are worsening.  Other issues 
must be taken into account.  For example, recent neoliberal policies (which will be examined in 
greater depth in chapter 3) enacted by the post-Apartheid government have perpetuated and even 
increased inequalities between the rich and poor within the country25.  Additionally, rapid trade 
liberalization, which increased wage competition, put the manufacturing sector under enormous 
financial pressure.  The result was an increase in unemployment to levels over 40% of the
population26.  As rural areas suffered from decreased wages, many women as well as men27
began migrating into informal urban areas.  These changes also impacted the structure of 
households, and percentage of marriages declined28.  The mushrooming of informal settlements, 
which is in many cases attributed to the end of influx controls as the Apartheid policies were 
negated, was perpetuated by the reorganisation of rural households which was a by-product of 
increased social inequalities created by the current government’s neoliberal economic policies29.  
All of these factors have perpetuated the ‘high risk situation’ described by Marks.  The key point 
is that this high risk situation is not something that ended with Apartheid, but instead, is being 
perpetuated by current governmental policies.  
                                                          
25 Hunter, Mark. "The changing political economy of sex in South Africa: The significance of unemployment and 
inequalities tothe scale of the AIDS pandemic." Social Science & Medicine 64 (2007): 689-700.
26 Kenny and Webster 1998, as cited in Hunter, “The changing political economy of sex”.
27 Men’s migration has long been attributed to the spread of sexually transmitted diseases within South Africa.  See 
Hunter, “The changing political economy of sex” for a review of literature in this area.
28 For a more in depth examination of women’s migration and decline of marriage, see Hunter, “The changing 
political economy of sex”. 
29  Ibid.
9When Nelson Mandela, as the head of the ANC, was elected president of the new 
democratic South Africa in 1994, there was wide celebration among democratic nations across 
the globe.  At last, the era of racialised Apartheid had officially ended, and though it was already 
clear that AIDS was beginning to gain a hold on the South African population, there was no 
apparent reason that the new government would not be able to adequately address the issue and 
implement policy to block the progress of the disease.  However, South Africa was struggling to 
gain control of its most pressing health issues while at the same time creating a political structure 
that would represent its people.  A quick look at current statistics shows that the struggle did not 
attain total success.  Though South Africa has one of the highest per-capita GDP (PPP adjusted) 
among similar middle-income countries, its social indicators are significantly lower (See 
10
Table 1 'Comparison of Five Middle Income Countries').  According to the UNDP’s 2006 
Human Development Report, the Human Development Index for South Africa was at a .653 in 
1975, raising slowly until hitting a peak in 1995 at .741, and then, despite the end of the 
Apartheid era, declining to a .653 by 2004 (See Figure 1 ‘Human Development Index Trends ’).  
From the same report we see that the percent of population that had access to clean water had 
fallen from 69 in 1990 to 65 in 2004, and the overall per capita growth rate from 1975 until 2004 
was -0.530.
                                                          
30 Statistics taken from UNDP. "Human Development Report 2006:South Africa." United Nations Development 
Programme. http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/coutnry_fact_sheets/cty_fs_ZAF.html (accessed October 2007).
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Figure 1 ‘Human Development Index Trends
31
’
                                                          
31 Though Human Development Index Data before 1991 is largely estimated, and most likely inflated, social 
indicator trends since the end of Apartheid show that social indicators continue to fall, suggesting that the graph, 
while representing estimated data before 1991, does accurately portray the decline of social indicators after 1991.  
Source: UNDP, “HDR 2006: South Africa”.  
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Table 1 'Comparison of Five Middle Income Countries
32
'
Comparison of five middle-income countries
HDI 
Rank
COUNTRY 
GDP per 
capita  (PPP 
US$) (HDI) 
2004
Children
under height 
for age (% 
under age) 
1996-2004
HIV prevalence 
(% ages 15-49) 
2005
Life 
expectancy 
at birth 
(years) 
1970-75 
Life 
expectancy 
at birth 
(years)2000
-05
Gini 
Index
Average 
Middle 
Income 
Country
6,756 .. 0.6 [0.5 - 0.8] 62 70 ..
50 Cuba .. 5 0.1 [<0.2] 70.7 77.2 ..
61 Malaysia 10,276 16 0.5 [0.2 – 1.5] 63 73 49.2
69 Brazil 8,195 11 0.5 [0.3 – 1.6] 59.5 70.3 58
74 Thailand 8,090 13 1.4 [0.7 – 2.1] 61 69.7 42
81 China 5,896 14 0.1 [<0.2] 63.2 71.5 44.7
121 South Africa 11,192 25 18.8 [16.8 – 20.7]53.7 49 57.8
This overall decline in development indicators for South Africa over the last thirty years 
can be contextualised by taking a deeper look into the causes and perpetuation of the inequalities 
that exist today in South Africa.  After Apartheid, no quick fix was available to the government 
to ‘undo’ consequences of the prolonged segregation of South Africa’s people.  For nearly half 
of a century, inequity had been legalised, and though the ANC government worked hard to 
change policy, economic decline prevailed.  The government did attempt to provide health care 
to thousands of people who had never before had access, but because changes in budgets shifted 
money away from urban hospitals into rural clinics, there was a severe decline in health care 
provided in the public hospitals33.
                                                          
32 Ibid.
33 Thompson, “A History of South Africa”.
13
The Politics of AIDS Policy in South Africa
Policies can be made and implemented by a great variety of different actors, including 
(but not limited to) non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international multilateral 
organisations such as the United Nations (UN), universities or governments34.  Even within these 
categories, policy can be created and implemented on a variety of levels – for example, in the 
case of South Africa, government policy creation and implementation it can take place on the 
local, provincial or national levels.  This thesis will concentrate almost exclusively on policy 
created and implemented at the level of the national government.
From the perspective of the national government, all things being equal, AIDS policy is 
similar to other types of governmental policy that demands citizens to do something that the 
government wants them to do, and it normally is comprised of two different parts: inducements, 
which are meant to convince people that said actions and habits are in their own best interest, and 
constraints, which put in place sanctions for not conforming to the actions or habits35.  AIDS is 
not caused by socio-economic conditions, but socio-economic conditions can certainly 
exacerbate the conditions under which people are more likely to make behavior choices that can 
spread the HI virus.  The purpose of AIDS policy is to attempt to establish new patterns of 
behavior and new habits among citizens - getting individuals to do something that they may not 
normally do or want to do.  Examples include: getting citizens to wear condoms, use clean 
needles, get tested for HIV or abstain from sexual relations.  
However, because of the nature of the behaviours associated with the spread of HIV (see 
section above), the government may not always be the most effective actor to address the 
epidemic.  Non-governmental actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) may 
actually be better suited to respond effectively to the epidemic.  As defined by Broadhead and 
O’Malley, ‘non-governmental organisations’ (NGOs) are diverse organisations that “work 
together outside of government to address a need, advance a cause or defend an interest36.”  The 
                                                          
34 Fourie, Pieter. The political management of HIV and AIDS in South Africa: one burden too many? New York: 
Palgrove Macmillan, 2006: 8.
35 Garui, Varun, and Evan Lieverman. "AIDS and the State: the Politics of Government Responses to the Epidemic 
in Brazil and South Africa." Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2004: 1-50.
36 Broadhead and O’Malley, 1989, as quoted in Setha, Hormazd. "The Role of Non-governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) in HIV/AIDS preventiona and care." Case Western Reserve University. 2003. 
www.cwru.edu/med/epidbio/mphp439/GNOs&AIDS.htm.
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World Bank builds upon that definition, stating that NGOs are ‘private organisations that pursue 
activities to relieve suffering, promote the interest of the poor, protect the environment or 
undertake community development37.”  NGOs have a unique role in providing services to 
citizens.  Though every NGO has different strengths, a common characteristic of NGOs is that 
they are normally much smaller and have more flexible administrative systems as well as more 
manageable bureaucracies than do governmental organisations.  Because of this, NGOs are 
typically more capable of dealing on the grassroots level with sensitive issues (such as sexuality 
or condom use).  They are also usually staffed by community members, which gives them 
credibility within the communities in which they serve, and makes it more likely that they will 
attract community participation in their campaigns38.
Because of the relative strengths of non-governmental actors like NGOs, it would seem 
logical that the South African government would seek to cooperate and collaborate in the 
formation and implementation of AIDS policy.  However, this has not been the case.  Quite on 
the contrary, relations between the state and non-state actors in South Africa have been 
characterised as nothing less that ‘hostile39.’  
This leaves us with the question: Why has the South Africa state been unwilling to 
cooperate with non-state actors in order to best address the AIDS epidemic?  Chapter 3 will 
venture to address this question, building on an argument put forward by Helen Schneider (2002) 
that uses Bourdieu’s (1986) typology of capitals in order to explain the contestation regarding 
AIDS policy and implementation between state and non-state actors.  Though this argument goes 
a long way in offering an explanation for conflict that has taken place in regards to AIDS policy, 
it does not explain why members of the South African government, particularly former President 
Mbeki and his Health Minister, went to the extreme of adopting dissident or denialist views on 
the very biomedical causes of AIDS.  The manner in which they conceptualise the problem at 
hand will very much affect the way in which they draft and implement policies in which to 
address that problem.  In the case of AIDS in South Africa, the policy arena has become 
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inundated with what Helen Schneider has referred to as ‘high politics.40’  This has deeply 
affected the way in which AIDS policies have been created and implemented.   
AIDS Science vs. AIDS Denialism
AIDS Science
Before continuing, it is important to establish a framework through which to view the 
AIDs problem in South Africa, especially considering that the science regarding HIV and AIDS 
has been questioned by the President himself.  This thesis is working within scientific 
understanding that HIV is the causal link to AIDS.  
The science of HIV and AIDS has been well established within the international 
scientific community, and has been accepted for years by multilateral and international 
organisations such as the United Nations and the World Health Organization.  The scientific 
explanation goes something like this: HIV is the abbreviation for the ‘human immunodeficiency 
virus’.  HIV primarily infects white blood cells known as CD4 positive T-cells, though it can 
also infect other cells such as macrophages.  Both T cells and macrophages are key components 
of the cellular immune system, and HIV essentially destroys these cells or damages their 
function41.  AIDS stands for ‘acquired immunodeficiency syndrome’ and is a “surveillance 
definition based on signs, systems, infections, and cancers associated with the deficiency of the 
immune system that stems from infection with HIV42.”  Unless treated, AIDS leads rapidly to 
death.
HIV is found in bodily fluids such as blood, semen, vaginal fluids and breast milk, and is 
spread through the transmission of these fluids (though activities such as unprotected penetrative 
(vaginal or anal) and oral sex with an infected person; blood transfusion or the use of 
contaminated syringes, needles, or other sharp objects; or from an infected mother to her child 
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during pregnancy and breastfeeding43).  Once inside an infected cell, HIV multiplies and makes 
copies of itself, which are able to go on and infect healthy cells within the body.  The more 
healthy cells that are infected, the more deficient the immune system becomes (hence the term 
immunodeficiency).  Though there is no cure for HIV, there is treatment available that greatly 
reduces the virus’ ability to replicate within the body, and therefore drastically slows down the 
progression towards AIDS.  HIV treatment, called antiretrovirals (ARVs), interfere with the 
manner in which HIV produces copies of itself and the way that it spreads from cell to cell44.  
There are several different classes of ARVs; brief descriptions of three of the main classes 
follow:
 Nucleoside Reverse Transcriptase Inhibitors (NRTIs):  HIV is a retrovirus.  This means 
that instead of its genetic information being located in its deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), 
it is located in its ribonucleic acid (RNA).  All retroviruses use a substance known as 
reverse transcriptase to synthesise RNA into DNA45.  HIV therefore needs reverse 
transcriptase to make new copies of itself.  NRTIs block the reverse transcriptase by 
“fooling” the reverse transcriptase into using them rather than DNA, and therefore block
the creation of new HI virons46.
 Non-Nucleoside Reverse Transcriptase Inhibitors (NNRTIs): like the last group, this 
group also blocks the reverse transcriptase, but by binding directly to it and thereby 
disabling it47.
 Protease Inhibitors: Once inside the nucleus of a call, HIV DNA essentially plants itself 
into the host-cell chromosome, and begins creating viral RNA, which ‘buds’ out of the 
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cell.  To do this process, HIV needs a substance called Protease, and PIs block the 
creation of new virons by blocking this substance48.   
The first ARV drug was an NRTI named Azidothymidine, or AZT.  If taken by an HIV-
positive mother shortly before giving birth, and then given to the at-risk infant shortly after birth, 
it was shown to be extremely effective in drastically reducing the chance of HIV infection from 
mother to child.  Though AZT was initially effective in stopping viral replication, as the virus 
evolved and subsequently developed drug resistance, the effectiveness of AZT was undermined.   
Today, the standard treatment for people living with HIV is a drug ‘cocktail’ of three or more 
ARVs49.  This combination of drug targets different components of the HIV replication cycle 
highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART).  
AIDS Denialism
Though the biomedical conceptualisation of HIV and AIDS as described above is widely 
accepted as unquestionable, there is a small but vociferous ‘denialist’ camp that refutes the 
scientific evidence regarding HIV and AIDS.  Though personal denial regarding HIV and AIDS 
is quite common, meaning that it is common that individuals refuse to acknowledge that they or 
their partners have or at risk of contracting HIV in the face of all reason, very few people deny 
the evidence about the HIV/AIDS pandemic in general.  As De Waal states: 
Across the continent, there are billboards and radio messages, statements from 
politicians and church leaders, news stories and NGO programmes, all 
hammering home the message that HIV/AIDS is a risk.  In the 2003 round of 
the Afrobarometer survey, more than half of respondents in Kenya, Malawi, 
Namibia, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia reported that they had lost at least one 
close friend or relative to AIDS.  In Uganda it was 85 per cent and the median 
number of friends or relatives said to have died of AIDS was five.  What these 
figures tell us is that most people readily accept that HIV/AIDS exists, even 
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though many refuse to accept the possibility that they might have contracted 
the virus50.
South Africa, however, is a special case.  In the same Afrobarometer survey that de Waal 
described, only 18 percent of South Africans reported a personal loss due to AIDS.  Among 
those who refused to acknowledge a personal loss was former President Thabo Mbeki51.  Many 
people believe that Mbeki ascribes to AIDS denialism or dissidence.  De Waal describes 
denialist or dissident views as “including the scientific or epidemiological denialism propounded 
by a small number of ‘dissident’ academics, who claim that HIV does not cause AIDS, that 
AIDS does not exist, or that the statistics of HIV prevalence are erroneous or fraudulent52.”
Because AIDS denialism has become so relevant to the South African policy-making 
environment, understanding the denialists claims are important.  Edwin Cameron explains their 
positions further:
“Denialists assert that the "hypothesis" that Aids is caused by a sexually 
transmitted virus is unproven and irresponsible. Aids in North America and 
Western European they attribute to "the long-term consumption of recreational 
drugs" and to the widespread use of drugs as sexual stimulants by homosexual 
men and, more recently, to the administration of anti-retroviral drugs that 
doctors wrongly prescribe for Aids. 
They refute the "impression" that there is a microbial epidemic in Africa, 
ascribing it instead to "non-contagious risk factors that are limited to certain 
sub-sets of the African population". The millions of deaths attributed to Aids 
they characterise as "a minor fraction of conventional mortality under a new 
name53". 
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Nattrass also explains:
“…a group of AIDS denialists in Australia (the so-called Perth Group) insists 
that HIV does not exist – recently testifying to this effect in an Australian 
court… Other AIDS denialists accept the existence of HIV but, following Peter 
Duesberg (a molecular biologist at the University of California), believe it to be 
harmless.  What unites them all is the unshakable belief that the existing canon 
of AIDS science is wrong and that AIDS deaths are caused by malnutrition, 
narcotics, and ARV drugs themselves….54”
This is not to say that questioning mainstream science is always a bad thing.  On the 
contrary, both dissent and critique are central to science55.  However, the current day AIDS 
‘dissidents’ have gone beyond scientific reason in their questioning:
In the 1980s, it was understandable that AIDS dissidents were uneasy about the 
claim that one virus could cause so many different diseases.  But, once it was 
shown that HIV worked by undermining the immune system, thereby rendering 
the body vulnerable to a host of opportunistic infections, their concerns should 
have been put to rest.  Similarly, the wealth of data on the successes of ARV 
treatment should have alleviated their initial worries about its overall 
therapeutic benefit.  Thus one of the early AIDS dissident doctors, Joseph 
Sonnabend, had, by 2000, welcomed the life-saving capacity of ARVs, 
describing them as a “wonderful bless”.  However, this did not deter today’s 
AIDS denialists, who continue to cite his dated views on their Web sites n 
support of their unchanged views.
The highly controversial nature of AIDS denialists’ views makes Mbeki’s attraction to 
them perplexing.  Why is it that a man of his stature and intellect would be willing to make the 
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political risk in exploring and adopting such views?  This question will be examined in much 
more depth in Chapter 4.
In order to understand the controversial stances that these governmental leaders took, 
Chapter 4 will examine the very framework in which policy-making takes place.  Importantly, 
government policy-makers are forming policy within a specific political context, and Chapter 4 
will analyze the role of identity and the production of knowledge within the specific context of 
post-Apartheid South Africa in an attempt to elucidate Mbeki’s particular conceptualisation of 
AIDS.  
This thesis’ attempts to explain the policy contradiction and contestation in South Africa 
are no more than they claim to be.  No one will ever know for sure exactly why particular policy-
makers and implementers have responded the way that they have.  However, two resounding 
facts emerge: first, the HIV and AIDS problem in South Africa is both massive and devastating; 
second, the government has failed to adequately respond to the epidemic despite the transition to 
democracy in 1994.  Irrespective of any governmental policies or actions, the exponential rise in 
HIV statistics prove that this policy either has not worked or has not been implemented at all.  
This thesis is concerned with why South Africa’s government has failed so drastically in 
adequately addressing the AIDS pandemic.
21
Chapter 2 – AIDS Policy and Conflict in 
post-Apartheid South Africa
An important component of many state strategies for influencing patterns of behavior that 
are connected with the spread of disease is a partnership between the state and non-governmental 
actors and organisations.  This may take the form of consultancies, provision of monetary 
resources, or even symbolic encouragement56.  However, the overall response to HIV and AIDS 
in South Africa has been widely characterised by a “vicious cycle of growing alienation between 
key members of the state and non-governmental AIDS actors57.”  Even carefully drafted AIDS 
policies have been derailed and generally implemented poorly, resulting in the South African 
government’s inability to realise any sort of strategic plan substantially reducing the risk of HIV 
transmission or AIDS-related deaths58.  Much of this may be due to the fact that relations 
between the national government of South Africa and non-governmental actors (both local and 
international) have been riddled with conflict instead of cooperation.  South Africa’s mineral 
wealth has allowed it to remain generally non-dependent on foreign aid, unlike its less resource-
rich counterparts in the rest of Africa59.  This distant relationship with international organisations 
was compounded during the Apartheid era, when the South African government was considered 
an international pariah, greatly limiting relationships with international organisation and donor 
funding.  At the domestic level, however, an active civil society grew out of resistance to 
Apartheid.  Within the context of this massive civil society mobilization against the Apartheid
state, local NGOs proliferated.  
Before the transition to democracy, then, it is possible to characterise the relationship 
between international organisations and the South African state as distant and non-collaborative, 
and the relationship between the state and domestic civil society/NGOs as hostile.  However, 
with the end of Apartheid, there were high hopes that civil society would become a partner to the 
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state in order to re-enfranchise the majority of the citizens and provide a better life for all, 
including an aggressive and adequate response to the burgeoning AIDS epidemic.  
This chapter will discuss a number of the contestations that have taken place around HIV 
and AIDS policy in South Africa, with a focus on the growing rift between the state and non-
governmental actors.
The National AIDS Plan
In the phase of transition to democracy, a cooperative partnership between the state and 
civil society regarding formulation of AIDS policy seemed highly possible. During the run-up to 
democracy before 1994, a large number of actors, both state and non-state, were involved in 
debating both the content and the principles of an appropriate response to AIDS60, and 
representatives of numerous NGOs provided vocal input into the development of HIV and AIDS 
policy61.  In October of 1992, a year and a half before the first democratic elections, the National 
AIDS Convention of South Africa (NACOSA), an umbrella organisation that included 
governmental and civil society actors, was born out of a series of consultative meetings that were 
held between the incumbent government and a range of ANC-aligned health practitioners62.  The 
purpose of NACOSA was to coordinate the policy development process and to write a 
comprehensive National AIDS Plan so that the new democratically elected government could 
begin implementing the policy immediately after taking office.  Despite the historically hands-
off approach of international NGOs in South Africa, the WHO, United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), Department for International Development (DFID), the 
European Community and the government of Belgium all provided technical assistance in 
drafting the specifics of the National AIDS Plan, which included the procurement and 
distribution of condoms and education materials63.   
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The National AIDS Plan outlined a framework for an integrated and collaborative 
response to HIV and AIDS, including six different areas through which to address the epidemic: 
prevention (with a focus on education); counseling (for those infected); health care; upholding 
human rights and law reform; overall welfare; and research64. The key goals and objectives of 
the Plan were to: prevent the transmission of HIV, provide care for those infected and affected 
by HIV and AIDS, alleviate the impact of the AIDS epidemic on communities, support those not 
infected by HIV in remaining uninfected, provide a medium for South Africans to become 
involved in efforts to prevent the further spread of HIV and AIDS, identify resources that could 
be used to combat AIDS, and ensure community involvement in all levels of the development 
and implementation of the National AIDS Plan65.  The Plan couched the AIDS epidemic within a 
broad social framework that included education, prevention and care, and emphasised the 
importance of both prevention and care strategies.  This is significant: in later years, treatment 
and prevention strategies were largely polarised and treated as mutually exclusive in 
governmental policy-making66, creating conflict between various actors who believed that one or 
the other should be emphasised.  Also significant is that in the National AIDS Plan, there was a 
strong emphasis on unifying and mobilising resources among the local, provincial, national and 
international levels67, and a call for cooperation and collaboration between state and non-state 
actors. 
The formulation of the National AIDS Plan was considered an important step forward in 
addressing the escalating AIDS epidemic, and many believed that it was only the beginning of an 
organised, progressive and deliberate response.  Several of the members of the eight-member 
drafting team went on to hold high positions within the ANC-led government, including 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, who went on to become the first two 
Health Ministers (under President Mandela and President Mbeki, respectively) for post-
Apartheid South Africa68.  The importance of the plan lay especially in the manner in which it 
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couched a response to the epidemic as the protection of basic human rights, as well as in the 
participatory manner in which it was crafted.  This established an expectation of future 
collaborative, human-rights based participation in AIDS policy69 by both state and non-state 
actors.  In short, the new government of South Africa entered office with a promising 
arrangement for a uniquely effective attack on the AIDS epidemic.  There were a number of 
consultative structures in place, a progressive and lauded AIDS policy framework was laid out, 
and supportive relations with health professions had been established70.  
However, despite the idea that the National AIDS Plan was an ‘ideal’ policy that 
incorporated all of the right ideas about collaboration and a human rights-based approach, 
empirical data showed that it was not effective in achieving the plan’s primary goal: over time to 
lower HIV prevalence and AIDS morbidity/mortality within the population71.  Among women 
attending antenatal clinics in 1994, the figure for HIV prevalence was an unsettling 7.6%.  
Moreover, in spite of the implementation of the National AIDS Plan, this figure not only failed to 
stabilise, but increased during the tenure of the Mandela government, and tripled to over 24% by 
the year 2000 (see Table 2 'HIV seroprevalence in South Africa')72.  Though analysts are largely 
in agreement that the contents of the National AIDS Plan are not to be faulted, it is clear that 
something went terribly wrong.
Table 2 'HIV seroprevalence in South Africa
73
'
Year Women attending antenatal clinics % Total population
1990 0.8 0.1
1991 1.4 0.3
1992 2.4 0.6
1993 4.3 1.1
1994 7.6 1.8
1995 10.4 2.9
1996 14.2 4.5
1997 17.0 6.3
1998 22.8 8.2
1999 22.4 10.1
2000 24.5 11.7
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Policy Contradictions: Macroeconomic Shifts
Significantly, democracy in South Africa came at a time when the dominant global 
opinion about development focused on neoliberal ideology of fiscal restraint and liberalization of 
markets.  The introduction of neo-liberal macroeconomic reforms within South Africa, designed 
to attract foreign investment and corroborate with the prescriptions of capitalist globalization, 
had a devastating effect on employment and income levels for the poor74 as well as for policies 
such as the National AIDS Plan that relied on a development-based approach for successful 
implementation.   
For the first half of the 1990s, the post-Apartheid government’s strategy was guided by 
the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which included a strong role for a 
“neo-Keynesian” state whose role would facilitate social transformation and which emphasised 
the need for people-driven development75.  The RDP was designed to break down the negative 
relationship between the state and society and intended to bind the state to economically
redistributive policies which were aimed to meeting the basic needs of the majority of the 
population of South Africa76.  The RDP embraced the normative model of the National AIDS 
Plan, even elevating the plan to one of its five central elements77.  Both RDP and the National 
AIDS Plan included similar values: “policy-making would be inclusive, conciliatory, stable and 
consensual, focusing on bottom-up, populist measure mechanisms to ensure that all the 
appropriate policy stakeholders take ownership of the policies78.”  These ‘pro-poor’ policies 
were slanted strongly toward development, with such priorities as “social spending for the sake 
of alleviating the plight of the indigent79.”  It was believed that this type of development model 
would address the societal issues that exacerbated the conditions in which HIV was spread: 
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The rational and logical way properly to manage [AIDS] is to contextualise it 
within the [RDP] paradigm, and to approach the problem with the principles 
and concepts embodied in the RDP.  The RDP concept itself will in the long 
run do the most to minimize the impact of the epidemic…80
However, in April of 1996, amid a broad shift in the policy-making environment, the 
RDP was discarded.  Though the government promised not to abandon the developmental focus 
of its key policies, in June, the ANC announced the adoption of the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution Strategy (GEAR).  The intention of GEAR was to spur economic growth by 
reducing state expenditure and promoting fiscal responsibility81.  GEAR set into policy the 
prioritization of a neo-liberal ideology, which significantly impacted AIDS policy 
implementation.  The adoption of GEAR therefore essentially revealed an overall governmental 
shift from a pro-poor policy-making stance to a pro-growth macroeconomic policy stance.  As a 
part of the neo-liberal project, which by nature cuts back on state spending, GEAR arguably had 
the most impact on the health sector, which depended heavily on social spending.  GEAR and 
other like policies resulted in a 14.1% decline in per capita investment in social welfare 
programmes between 1995 and 200282.    In addition, although there has been some improvement 
in health spending among the most disadvantaged provinces, real per capita health expenditure 
has only increased at an annual rate of 0.3% since 199883.  This slowed the health care sector 
transformation, which in turn perpetuated Apartheid institutions and economic legacies.  For 
example, in 1994, the Mandela administration set out to shift large amounts of resources away 
from the tertiary care system into a clinic-based primary care system.  Because of fiscal 
restraints, however, this shift was not fully implemented84, thus allowing the Apartheid-era 
inequitable health financing to continue.  The neoliberal push also impacted AIDS policy 
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implementation by escalating the bureaucracy’s inability to implement AIDS policies in the face 
of restrictions of government expenditures85.  Like many of the social policies put forward at this 
time, the National AIDS Plan greatly overestimated the new government’s capacity to implement 
the suggested policies86, especially in a context of fiscal restraint, and the plan essentially 
drowned among an environment of governmental restructuring and institutional roadblocks87.  
Despite the fact that the National AIDS Plan was entitled to preferential access to funding 
because of its special status of a Presidential Lead Project, the new government instead 
concentrated funds on restructuring the health system and improving basic health care88.  The 
result was very little implementation89 of the policies put forward90. Neoliberal ideals 
encouraged the ANC toward a more closed and centralised political leadership and policy 
processes.  This ran contrary to the expectations of most South Africans as to the manner in 
which a participatory democracy should function.  
In the context of the massive policy shift, it was decided that the governance of AIDS 
policy would be situated in the National Department of Health rather than the Presidency.  This 
undermined the ideal of the National AIDS Plan to keep the AIDS policy problem couched as a 
human rights issue.  This also meant that it would be the Health Minister, not the President, who 
would be the main policy actor with regards to addressing the epidemic91.   
[T]his undermined the relationship between South Africa’s HIV and AIDS 
civil society and the government, and counteracted the spirit underpinning the 
[National AIDS Plan]’s mission to facilitate inter-and cross-sectoral co-
operation.  Instead of taking on the AIDS issue at a macro yet powerful 
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presidential level, it was left to the Health Ministry and other individual 
government departments to co-ordinate activities.  The distance that had 
opened between the government and civil society on this issue was later played 
out in the discursive environment and AIDS actors willingness and ability to 
redefine the AIDS policy problem…the schism between civil society and the 
state presaged a battle between the government’s increasingly obdurate 
position on the importance of prevention, versus civil society’s insistence on 
access to treatment for people who were already living with the virus92.
During this same time there was a great shift in the relations between the government and 
non-governmental organisations.  Firstly, the NGO community was weakened by the transition 
to democracy, as many senior staff from NGOs transitioned into governmental positions93.  And 
secondly, unlike the period of time leading to the transition to democracy, there was little contact 
between the governmental offices and NGO AIDS actors.  Reflective of this change in 
governance lack of consultation, the then Health Minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, was 
quoted in the Mail and Guardian as saying “AIDS does not consult, it infects people94.”
Scandal: Sarafina II and Virodene
Implementation issues surrounding AIDS policy were further complicated by a series of 
scandals regarding governmental policy decisions.  In 1995, the Health Ministry decided to 
commission a musical, Sarafina II, which was designed to educate the masses about AIDS95.  
The budget for the production was huge, with a governmental contract of more than R14 million, 
and there was a massive outcry from a wide variety of non-governmental actors when news was 
released about the governmental contract for the musical.   Complaints about the musical 
included both the content of the production and the manner in which the Health Minister had 
gone about funding it.  The content of the play and its messages were criticised for not reaching 
their intended market and for including controversial messages about HIV and AIDS, which 
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undercut the value in the production96.  The Health Ministry was criticised for the secrecy of the 
process, the unauthorised expenditure of the money used for the production (improperly 
allocated European Union funding), and the large amount of money that was involved97 that 
should have gone to other AIDS prevention and education programmes. 
The scandal surrounding Sarafina II was a watershed event regarding relations between 
the Health Department and civil society98.  As a NACOSA briefing states: “Sarafina II has done 
immense damage to the individuals and organisations active in the AIDS field.  The process was 
not transparent and this has resulted in a rift between the Department of Health, NACOSA and 
the NGOs, as well as public derision about and hostility to HIV/AIDS work and programmes99.”  
The scandal was the new government’s first real experience with widespread opposition from its 
constituency, and this rift did not go unnoticed by governmental leaders.  President Mandela later 
described the Sarafina II debacle as one of the three mistakes of the ANC in 1996100.  However, 
even while the matter was still being investigated, the government found itself tied up in yet 
another AIDS policy-related scandal.
The outrage over Sarafina II was shadowed the next year by the Virodene scandal.  This 
scandal was significant not only in the fact that it fomented the conflict between the government 
and civil society over the best way in which to address the AIDS epidemic, but it also was an 
indicator of the beginning of Mbeki questioning the authority of AIDS science101.  
In 1996, President Mandela’s Health Minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, was contacted 
by Olga Visser, a medical technician from Pretoria, who claimed to have discovered a treatment 
for AIDS102.  Visser reported to Dlamini-Zuma that she had given a treatment of what she called 
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‘Virodene’ (which consisted of a substance known as dimethylformamide or DMF) to several 
South African AIDS patients and had achieved excellent results.  Minister Dlamini-Zuma 
quickly approved further human trials of the treatment.  Mbeki, who was then the deputy 
president under Mandela, became intrigued when the results of the further trials delivered 
purportedly promising results.  Mbeki invited Visser and her colleagues to present the findings 
from their trials at a cabinet meeting.  Their presentation reportedly received enthusiastic 
applause.
However, the excitement soon hit a roadblock.  When the South African Medicines 
Control Council (MCC) found out about Visser’s trials, they immediately sought to halt them, 
citing that there was no evidence that DMF was anything more than a toxic chemical.  The MCC, 
which oversees the clinical trials of any pharmaceuticals in South Africa, deemed the Virodene 
trials unscientific and stated that although DMF was useful for a variety of industrial uses 
(including dry cleaning), there was a lack of evidence showing that it could be used in any way 
as medicine.  Additionally, DMF was known to cause a variety of side effects such as liver 
damage and skin rashes.  Despite the condemnation from the MCC, the Virodene researchers 
continued their research, supposedly with Mbeki’s blessing.  When in 1998 the MCC again 
attempted to stop the trials, the chairman and two other top officials from the council were fired.  
This event like the Sarafina II debacle, greatly undermined the relationship between the state and 
NGOs as NGO groups vociferously criticised the actions of the government, and the government 
responded defensively: “The Virodene saga is significant in that it opened up the government to 
a new line of criticism regarding its handling of HIV and AIDS as a public policy issue, namely, 
that the government was interfering in science and not focusing on what they were supposed to 
be doing: governing the country and implementing policies103.”  The Virodene saga is also 
significant in that when compared to the government’s later responses to HIV treatment options, 
it highlights a stark contradiction.  Mbeki and his followers within the government later rejected 
the use of ARVs as an option for the treatment and prevention of HIV and AIDS just as 
zealously as they embraced Virodene.
Following the Sarafina II and Virodene debacles, power surrounding issues of AIDS 
policy creation and implementation became increasingly concentrated, and the presidency began 
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to be less willing to elicit outside sources of expert advice.  The interactions between state and 
NGOs began to be characterised in large part by growing suspicion104.  Although the government 
and NGO actors had again attempted to coordinate a national vision for AIDS policy in another 
national conference in 1997, the distance between governmental and non-governmental actors 
grew as it became clear that the implementation of transformative policies remained low on the 
list of the national government’s priorities105.  
In terms of HIV and AIDS policy-making, Peter Fourie argues that the adoption of 
GEAR, the failure to implement the National AIDS Plan and the scandals led to a fundamental 
redefinition of the AIDS policy problem in South Africa:
“The first phase of public policy-making on HIV and AIDS under the Mandela 
government effectively came to an end in 1996.  Indicators of the shift to a 
second phase of AIDS public policy-making include: the demonstrable failure 
to implement the [National AIDS Plan] of 1994 effectively; the move from the 
RDP (abandoned in April 1996) to GEAR (announced in June 1996); and the 
emergence of an AIDS policy environment defined by public scandal106.”
In the latter half of the 1990s, the relationship between the states and non-governmental 
actors further deteriorated with the unequivocal contestation between key members of the South 
African state and major advocacy groups over access to treatment107.  
Organizing Civil Society: the TAC
In 1998, a Thai medical trail released results showing that if HIV positive pregnant women 
took a short course of AZT, maternal transmission of the virus to the child dropped from 18.9 to 
9.4 percent108.  The Gauteng provincial Health Department responded quickly to the findings by 
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setting up five pilot sites to test the Mother to Child Transmission Prevention (MTCTP)
programme, and after the price of AZT was cut by two-thirds, several more MTCTP programme
sites were introduced in various clinics around the country109.  However, in October, Health 
Minister Dlamini-Zuma announced the suspension of the MTCTP programmes, first claiming 
that the reason was so that the Department of Health could focus on ‘prevention,’ but when 
challenged that MTCTP programmes were a form of prevention, she stated that MTCTP
programmes were simply ‘unaffordable110’. 
For many activists, this move went too far.  On Human Rights Day in December of 1998, 
about fifteen AIDS activists gathered on the steps of St George’s Cathedral in Cape Town and 
demanded that medical treatment be administered to people living with HIV and AIDS111.  Their 
protests were in direct response to the government’s decision to halt MTCTP programmes and to 
deny funding for treatment in general.  Out of this gathering, the Treatment Action Campaign 
(TAC) was born.  One of the founders of the TAC, Mark Heywood, explained the reason for its 
formation: "It was clear by late 1998 that nobody was doing or saying anything about treatment 
and that we needed to create a movement led primarily by people affected by HIV directly112."
The TAC's objectives are described in the organisation's Constituion as follows:
 Campaign for equitable access to affordable treatment for all people with 
HIV/AIDS.
 Campaign for and support the prevention and elimination of all new HIV 
infections.
 Promote and sponsor legislation to ensure equal access to social services for and 
equal treatment of all people with HIV/AIDS.
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 Challenge by means of litigation, lobbying, advocacy and all forms of legitimate 
social mobilisation, any barrier or obstacle, including unfair discrimination, 
that limits access to treatment for HIV/AIDS in the private and public sector.
 Educate, promote and develop an understanding and commitment within all 
communities of developments in HIV/AIDS treatment.
 Campaign for access to affordable and quality health care for all people in South 
Africa.
 Train and develop a representative and effective leadership of people living with 
HIV/AIDS on the basis of equality and non-discrimination irrespective of race, 
gender, sexual orientation, disability, religion, sex, socio-economic status, 
nationality, marital status or any other ground.
 Campaign for an effective regional and global network comprising of 
organisations with similar aims and objectives113
The movement quickly grew; by 2004, it was reported to have 150 different chapters 
around the country and over 8,300 active members114.  It is currently the most high-profile AIDS 
social movement in South Africa115.  Over the years, TAC has linked themselves with a variety 
of global campaigns for drug access.  They have formed a strong alliance with international 
NGOs such as Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF)116.  Domestically, TAC mobilised within 
working-class black communities and used the trade union movement to garner support.  At its 
forefront is Zackie Achmat, a Muslim law graduate, former anti-Apartheid and gay activist, and 
openly HIV-positive person117.  The formation of the TAC was a defining moment in what 
became a battle to hold the government responsible for providing treatment to its HIV positive 
citizens.
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The government did not respond entirely positively to the momentum that the TAC and 
other non-governmental and civil society groups were gaining.  Despite a brief but successful 
partnership with the TAC over the battle against international pharmaceutical companies over the 
importation of cheap generic ARVs (see Chapter 3), the government refused to build on that 
collaboration.  This was epitomised in 2000, when the South African national AIDS Council 
(SANAC) was formed under the leadership of Deputy President Jacob Zuma.  Significantly, 
representation was not offered to the Treatment Action Campaign or to other high-profile NGOs 
such as the AIDS Law project.  This suggested the “government’s increasing desire to pursue an 
approach autonomous from the most recognizable non-government AIDS organisations118.”  
Questioning AIDS Science
Health Minister Dlamini-Zuma’s response to MTCTP programmes, which spurred the 
creation of the TAC, was actually only the first of a great wave of controversial governmental 
stances regarding AIDS treatment.  In 1999, Deputy President Thabo Mbeki became the second 
president of the new South Africa, and added a new Health Minister to his cabinet, Manto 
Tshabalala-Msimang.  Any anticipation that the new administration would bring a positive 
change with regards to AIDS policy was quickly squelched in 1999, when both President Mbeki 
and his new Health Minister began to openly question the connection between HIV and AIDS, as 
well as continue to challenge the use of the antiretroviral drug AZT for use in MTCTP, claim 
that it was toxic, and like the last administration, continued to refuse to make AZT available for 
the prevention of mother-to-child transmission widely available at public health institutions119.  
This same year, Mbeki began his highly publicised solicitation of AIDS dissident opinion120, 
convening a panel of these dissidents in addition to other scientists to reexamine core 
assumptions by the scientific community about HIV and AIDS.  
From the period 1999 through 2003, President Mbeki questioned the international 
scientific consensus that HIV was the causal link to AIDS, and multinational pharmaceutical 
companies, in conspiracy with Western scientists, were purposely exaggerating the claims about 
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the incidence and prevalence rates of HIV and AIDS in order to sell overpriced and unaffordable 
drugs.  At the beginning of 2000, President Mbeki sent a letter to several world leaders 
expressing the fact that he doubted that HIV was the sole determinant of AIDS and that other 
socioeconomic factors should be considered more thoroughly.  Shortly afterward, he convened a 
panel discussion between orthodox and heterodox AIDS experts.  The purpose of this 
presidential panel was to advise him on the appropriate responses to the South African AIDS 
epidemic121.    He also suggested that ARVs were toxic to South African patients, and that 
instead of using Western medicine, that the AIDS issue should be considered part of the ‘African 
renaissance’, where African people may discover an African cure for an African problem122.
Reactions to Mbeki’s controversial stance reached a fever pitch at the Durban AIDS 
Conference in 2000.  The Durban conference was highly significant in a number of ways as it 
was the very first international AIDS conference to be held in the developing world, and was key 
in drawing attention to the specific nature of AIDS epidemics playing themselves out in the 
developing world.  It was a moment of high tension surrounding international agenda-setting 
around MTCTP, vaccines, and the dire need to address the global inequalities in AIDS 
treatment.123 However, the events at the Durban conference, which included a vociferous march 
by the TAC and a speech by HIV-positive Justice Edwin Cameron,124 were very much 
overshadowed by the growing resistance to the statements that had been made by Mbeki and 
other governmental officials regarding HIV as causative of AIDS and skepticism about the 
toxicity and cost of ARVs.  Everyone knew that Mbeki had been consulting with AIDS 
dissidents, and the Durban conference was a chance for him to ‘clear his name’ of these 
‘denialist’ stances.  Mbeki gave the opening speech to the conference, and in the speech, claimed 
that “The world’s biggest killer and the greatest cause of ill health and suffering across the globe, 
including South Africa is extreme poverty’125, which was met with wide-spread disapproval.  
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Hundreds of conference participants walked out, citing the fact that Mbeki did not say that HIV 
causes AIDS.126
In April of 2000, the MEC for Health, Zweli Mkize, who was the deputy leader of the 
ANC in KwaZulu-Natal, published a statement that directly attacked the stances of the dissident 
scientists on Mbeki’s Presidential Panel.  Shortly thereafter the TAC launched a series of law 
suits designed to force national authorities to prescribe Nevirapine to HIV positive pregnant 
women.  The result was a constitutional court victory for the TAC, and amid this setting, a tacit 
rebellion against governmental HIV policy began to acquire support within the ANC127.  It was 
at this point in September of 2000 that Mbeki was called upon by the SACP and COSATU to 
stop raising questions about the causes of AIDS in public.  Shortly thereafter concerned 
commentary at an ANC National Executive Committee meeting led to the assurance that the 
president would ‘definitely try to be quiet about the issue’128.
Continued Conflict
Although Mbeki certainly had a cohort of supporters around him, including the Health 
Minister, there was also a strong insurgency of loyal ANC followers who deeply disagreed with 
his controversial stance.  Though in the AIDS denialist community AZT was questioned over its 
toxicity and effectiveness, the use of AZT for use in the prevention of MTCTP grew a strong 
base of support from many ANC members, including public expressions of support by Nelson 
Mandela, Winnie Mdikizelea-Mandela and MP Pregs Govender129.  In October of 2000, Health 
Minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, a loyal follower of Mbeki, was pressured to authorise the 
limited trial of prescriptions of AZT in hospitals in eight of the nine South African provinces.  
However, when early the next year the premier of Gauteng extended this programme to twelve 
hospitals in his province, he drew a sharp admonition from the minister130.
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Despite a number of outspoken and high profile critics, Mbeki’s views certainly had a 
number of supporters within the ANC, and even became orthodoxy to several health MEC’s, 
especially in the province of Mpumalanga.  Peter Mokaba was one of Mbeki’s more vociferous 
disciples, and was said to have been involved in the writing of the document called ‘Castro 
Hlongwane, Caravans, Cats, Geese, Foot and Mouth Statistics: HIV-AIDS and the Struggle for 
Humanity in South Africa.’  The paper asserted that AIDS was nothing more than a mythical 
illness that was used by those who wished to further exploit prejudices about African 
sexuality131.    The document was distributed widely in March of 2002, only shortly after Nelson 
Mandela had made a public plea that AZT be provided to the masses free of cost.  The Castro 
Hlongwane document claimed that anti-retroviral medication was responsible for the death of 
many supposed AIDS victims.  Mokaba died shortly after, most likely of AIDS.
At this point, the camp of Mbeki supporters on the AIDS issue was drawing enormous 
domestic and international condemnation.  The director general of the Department of Health, 
Ayanda Ntysabula, threatened resignation, and the Castro Hlongwane paper drew severe 
criticism from within the ANC.  Additionally, Nelson Mandela continued in his public support of 
the TAC, making appearances at key TAC demonstrations.  He also publicly expressed his 
unhappiness with the cabinet ministers who failed to oppose Mbeki’s views, and met personally 
with Mbeki in an attempt to reconcile differences.  
In December of 2001, six months after the Durban AIDS Conference, legal 
representatives of TAC argued in the High Court of South Africa that the South African state 
was constitutionally-bound to promote access to health care to its citizens.  They argued that this 
was extended to providing AIDS drug treatment132.  TAC won their case.  After a good deal of 
struggle, the government eventually announced plans to begin public treatment in 2003.  At this 
point, Zackie Achmat, the chairman of TAC, finally abandoned his pledge to refuse access to 
ARVs until they were distributed by the South African government to all people living with 
AIDS133.
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Mandela’s support, combined with the Constitutional Court’s ruling in favour of the 
TAC, and pro-AZT lobbying efforts of several figures from directly within Mbeki’s entourage all 
set the stage for a National Executive Council meeting and cabinet decision to expand the 
provision of Nevirapine134.  This decision was reached in mid-April of 2002, with a goal to make 
Nevirapine widely available by the beginning of 2003.
After years of international and civil society pressure, the South African public rejoiced 
in October of 2003 when the South African cabinet made a historic decision to roll out HAART.  
One month later, the Department of Health published what appeared to be an optimistic plan to 
have a million people on treatment by the year 2008, and it seemed as if South Africa’s 
controversial stance on providing ARV treatments to persons living with HIV AND AIDS was 
finally changing for the better.  However, the then Health Minister, Dr. Manto Tshabalala-
Msimang, was far from on board with the HAART rollout plan.  From the time of the cabinet 
decision, it took nearly a year – until September of 2004 – for the Department of Health to 
release even the treatment guidelines surrounding ARVs, greatly slowing the process, with the 
result that the pace of the rollout was incredibly sluggish and inefficient135.  The HAART roll-out 
only truly gained momentum in the immediate lead-up to the 2004 elections, causing many to 
speculate that the only real reason for the long-delayed roll-out was because of fear of political 
backlash.   Activist organisations such as the TAC saw the pace of the rollout as unacceptable, 
and responded with a series of marches and demonstrations.  Tension grew between 
governmental actors and the civil society organisations.  In July of 2005, police fired rubber 
bullets at 700 TAC protestors in the Eastern Cape, causing an international uproar136.
The mounting tension between non-governmental actors and the state also played itself 
out in the distribution of public finances.  Although governmental budgets have been allocated 
specifically towards the purpose of encouraging partnerships with NGOs and people who are 
living with HIV AND AIDS,137 the amounts have been discouragingly low.  Even in 2004, after 
the South African HIV AND AIDS budget had grown quite large, the amount of money that was 
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earmarked to transfer to NGOs was only R54 million.  Additionally, like many policies in the 
post-transition era, these too have been wracked with issues surrounding implementation.
Since then, relations between civil society, the TAC and the government have been 
rocky, with a number of highly public battles between them, each criticizing the other.  In a 
statement on May 5, 2005 by Sibani Mngadi, the spokesperson for the Health Minister, the 
Ministry of Health did not even attempt to conceal the hostility towards TAC:
“During the closing session of the international conference on microbicide 
held in Cape Town last week, Achmat went on to revive his old populist 
grand standing style, criticizing almost everything that government has done 
to address the challenge of HIV and AIDS in the country.  The first 
opportunity to have a TAC representative in the country delegation to an 
international forum has been squandered.  Zackie Achmat and his 
government-bashing lobby are back in action138”
Fortunately, relations seemed to have turned for the better in 2007, when the government 
of South Africa announced the new National Strategic Plan (NSP) for addressing HIV and AIDS, 
and TAC praised governmental efforts: “The TAC NEC believes that the NSP marks a genuine 
commitment by government to ambitious but achievable targets for the treatment and prevention 
of HIV, to monitor the epidemic appropriately and to ensure the rights of people affected by HIV 
are protected…TAC believes the NSP is a decisive break with AIDS denialism139.”  In the same 
report, the moderator commented on improved relations with the government: “TAC also noted 
its much closer relationship with government. In particular, the election of Mark Heywood as the 
Deputy Chair of SANAC, and better working relationships with a range of government 
departments at national, provincial and local levels…140”
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Conclusion
These are only a few in a long series of dramatic and conflict-ridden episodes in the story 
of AIDS policy and policy implementation in South Africa.  During the era of high-cost 
antiretroviral treatment, when pharmaceutical companies were still refusing to allow the 
manufacturing of cheap or generic forms of the medicines, governmental resistance to 
implementing treatment programmes was understandable even if it was not seen as ethical141.  
However, local production of generic drugs and substantial reduction in ARV prices have greatly 
changed the situation and many have found it is nothing less than bewildering as to why the 
Health Minister worked to delay or sabotage the implementation of policy that is coming from 
her own department, let alone why education or prevention campaigns are often met with 
hostility or resentment.
What is certain is that contestation over health policy prescriptions is nothing new in the 
Department of Health, or in the post-Apartheid South African government in general.  While the 
President, the Health Minister and others in the government have long questioned the biomedical 
causes and treatment of HIV and AIDS, other members of the cabinet and the Ministry of Health 
have quietly defied them by formulating a national strategic plan that comprises elements such as 
the treatment of opportunistic infections, sexual behaviour modification programmes and 
education.  However, with such high level discordance, it is no surprise that even the most 
cogent of policies addressing AIDS have not been implemented successfully.  A huge number of 
infrastructural and institutional constraints have frustrated attempts to implement any sort of a 
comprehensive prevention and treatment programme142 and have been compounded by
manoeuvrings by leadership.
In short, there is a high amount of contestation surrounding the formulation and 
implementation of AIDS policy in South Africa, and in order to be adequately understood, it is 
necessary to analyze possible explanations as to why this contestation is taking place.  
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Chapter 3 – AIDS Policy, Conflict and 
Power
The massive impact of the spread of HIV AND AIDS across Africa has been said to be 
one of the greatest humanitarian crises of our time, and has forced its way to the forefront of 
attention of national governments, international organisations and civil society across the globe.  
It has been increasingly clear that the AIDS epidemic is one that needs a colossal response from 
each of the economic, social, medical and political sectors.  Because of this, the epidemic is one 
that is demanding cooperation between the domestic and the international, and the governmental 
and non-governmental.  Since the 1980s, international organisations have been promoting 
technical guidelines for national governmental HIV and AIDS prevention and treatment 
programmes.  However, the transfer of policy between the international and domestic levels and 
between non-governmental organisations to government policy-makers is a highly complex 
process143, which challenges the very core of the communication and power dynamics within the 
territory of nations affected by the AIDS epidemic.  
Explaining the Conflict
It would seem that the government would have everything to gain by maintaining a 
cooperative relationship with non-state actors who hold a stake in the AIDS crisis, many of 
whom have powerful connections to international organizations and foreign governments and 
have large amounts of resources waiting to be directed toward addressing the AIDS epidemic in 
South Africa144.  The conflicted nature of the relationship between government and civil society 
regarding AIDS policies in South Africa (as discussed in the last chapter) is extremely difficult 
to comprehend.  The actions and stance of governmental leaders, especially those of former 
President Mbeki and his Health Minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, have been analysed by 
many authors, and a great deal of explanations have been put forward in an attempt to understand 
an apparently irrational approach to AIDS policy and uncooperative relationship with non-
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governmental actors regarding AIDS.  Their positions could easily be interpreted as an effort by 
the government to obfuscate the huge scale of the epidemic in the country, as well as conceal the 
massive challenges the epidemic creates for the project of nation building, the allocating of 
resources, and the urgent need to address poverty and inequality145.  This approach assumes that 
the former President, as well as other key policy-influencing members of his cabinet, are in 
‘denial’ about the very nature of HIV and AIDS and the government’s role in addressing the 
epidemic (either unintentionally because they have believed misinformation about the epidemic, 
or deliberately because they do not think it is possible to adequately address it or do not have a 
desire to do so).  One of the most prominent promoters of this ‘denialist’ explanation is Edwin 
Cameron, an HIV positive South African Supreme Court Judge and outspoken critic of President 
Mbeki’s stance on HIV and AIDS.  In a speech at Harvard Law School’s Human Rights 
Programme, Cameron lashed out at Mbeki, comparing the President’s stances on AIDS to that of 
a Holocaust denialist.  The speech ran on the front page of the Mail and Guardian on Easter day 
of 2003, titled “The Dead Hand of Denialism146.”  The denialist explanation has also been put 
forward and popularised by William Gumede147 and Allister Sparks148, both of whom 
highlighted Mbeki’s denialism as a key characteristic of the current state of affairs in South 
Africa.  Gumede, in particular, portrays Mbeki as having become a true AIDS dissident after 
being swayed heavily by AIDS denialist arguments through Internet research: “He stoically 
believes that he is a modern-day Copernicus who will ultimately be vindicated, even if 
posthumously149.”
However, not everyone is prepared to accept that the high levels of contestation and 
conflict within the AIDS policy-making environment in South Africa are due primarily to the 
controversial views of a small political elite.  Alternative reasons for the lack of successful policy 
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responses have therefore been put forward.  One of the most touted of these explanations is 
explaining policy failure in terms of the institutional constraints of the post-Apartheid state.
The new government inherited a health care system which was designed during the 
Apartheid era to attend to an intentionally fragmented society.  The central government was in 
charge of policy implementation, coordination and funding, but health care delivery was 
restricted to the provincial level150.  When the new government was negotiating with the 
Apartheid regime before the transition to democracy, it was decided that power would be divided 
between the national, provincial and local governments to ensure that centralization and single-
party control could be avoided.  Though this decision was made with the best of intentions, it left 
open the possibility of re-fragmentation and confusion over which level of government should be 
responsible for health care policy and service delivery151.  It also left responsibility of health care 
funding largely to the provincial level, which meant that richer, majority white provinces (whose 
health indicators resemble those of a developed country) were able to invest much more in their 
health care industry than the poorer provinces (whose health indicators resemble that of a least 
developed country – see Figure 2)152 .
Figure 2 'Per capita health expenditures in South Africa, by province153'
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The result has been a continuation of the racial dualism that limited access to health and 
welfare under Apartheid154.  Funding for health care has continued to be monopolised by tertiary 
academic institutions in the richest provinces, much because the private health care sector was 
left virtually untouched by the restructuring of national budgets that took place under GEAR155.  
Though it seems the only solution to eliminate these inequities across the provincial level would 
be a state led regulation of health care delivery and redistribution of wealth156, this is 
complicated by the legacy of autocracy that took place under the Apartheid regime.  Because of 
this legacy, the government is bound by the commitment to allow the nine nation provinces to 
retain their own administrations and responsibility to deliver social services157.
This institutional context could perhaps provide a compelling argument.  Fourie (2006) 
used the context of institutional restraints as his primary explanation for the policy confusion in 
post-Apartheid South Africa, arguing that AIDs was simply ‘one burden too many158.’  In 
addition, to explain the failure of AIDS policy in South Africa, Schneider and Stein159, 
Schneider160, Johnson161, and van Niekerk162 all use reasons such as the continual restructuring 
of the government on all levels caused by transition to democracy, institutional constraints due to 
the legacy of Apartheid that have limited access and funding for health care within the country, 
and adherence to neoliberal economic policies that have resulted in increased unemployment, 
migration of women in addition to men, declining martial rates and growth of informal urban 
areas, and overall increased social and economic inequalities.
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However, the problem with this kind of argument is that it does not take into account the 
fact that many of the policy issues over which the government obfuscated the most could have 
actually helped relieve pressure from the institutional constraints:  As Nattrass points out: 
Certainly with regard to MTCTP the institutional… constraints were negligible 
because it could have been provided using existing networks of clinics and 
hospitals.  Furthermore, it would have reduced the number of AIDS-sick 
children (thereby reducing pressure on hospital staff) and improved the morale 
of doctors and patients alike.  As an affidavit (for the TAC MTCTP case) from 
the acting medical superintendent of a rural hospital in KwaZulu-Natal noted, 
many doctors, when faced with the unbearable plight of HIV-positive pregnant 
women, opted to purchase Nevirapine for MTCTP out of their own pockets and 
the only ‘side effect’ has been ‘extreme gratefulness163’.
Additionally, arguments that justify the failure of South Africa’s AIDS policy by pointing 
to the structural and institutional constraints faced by the country fail to view South Africa’s 
situation comparatively with other developing nations.  ‘Institutional’ arguments “implicitly 
assume that South Africa’s challenges in the post-Apartheid period were unique in their 
difficulty, when in fact developing countries the world over are constantly battling with the 
challenge of building appropriate developmental infrastructure and policies in the face of scarce
resources164.”  
To illustrate this argument, Nattrass provides a comparative analysis which suggests that 
greater HAART coverage should have been possible, given South Africa’s level of development 
and institutional characteristics.  She concludes: “This suggests that a lack of political will to 
utilise ARVs was a key part of the South Africa story and not just cover for a deeper, underlying 
structural problem165.”
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Also important to take into account is that no matter what the inherited institutional 
constraints were upon the new government of South Africa, governmental leaders chose to adopt 
a neo-liberal macroeconomic model which has been perhaps one of the most daunting of the 
contextual constraints for AIDS policy in the post-Apartheid period.   As was discussed in 
Chapter 2, shifting away from RDP and toward the neo-liberal approach of GEAR greatly 
affected social spending and governmental capacity, and subsequently, affected the ability to 
implement social policies such as the National AIDS Plan.  Explaining policy conflict and failure 
within this economic context is appealing – as Nicoli Nattrass explains (who was an avid 
supporter of an ‘economic’ explanation for the confused AIDS policy environment in her 2004 
book):
After all, it was on economic grounds that the government resisted legal 
challenges to provide ARVs in the public sector for either HIV prevention or 
AIDS treatment.  But this argument cannot explain why the Health Minister 
turned down the offer from Boehringer Inglheim to provide Nevarapine free to 
government clinics.  It also cannot explain why the government disregarded 
studies – including its own – showing that it was cost-effective for government 
to provide MTCTP166.
Neoliberal economic policies, however, were not the only contextual constraint that 
AIDS policy implementation faced.  
There is no doubt that there is enormous incentive, and enormous pressure within the 
globalised world economy, for a state to transform itself to fit into the neo-liberal economic 
paradigm.  It would seem ‘rational’ that states would abandon development-centred policies in 
order to maintain themselves in a changing economy.  This was largely the argument the South 
African government used when they chose to abandon RDP and shift to GEAR as a 
macroeconomic strategy167.  However, research has shown that if a state committed to 
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47
development-focused social policy (such as the ‘pro-poor’ policies of the RDP) maintains 
productivity through an investment in its local labour force, higher state spending on social 
programmes can be maintained, despite competitive pressures in the global context168.  In 
relation to South African AIDS Policy, this argument is incredibly relevant.  First of all, it shows 
that the South African government has options in maintaining social spending, despite how 
‘unaffordable’ it may be.  This makes it all the more perplexing as to why Mbeki and his 
government, despite repeatedly citing poverty as a determinant for the spread of HIV and AIDS 
and unaffordability as a key reason as to why MCTCP programmes could not be implemented 
and HAART could not be rolled out earlier, adhered steadfastly to macroeconomic policies that 
undercut social spending.  Perhaps this contradiction could be explained by a fundamental 
paradox within the neo-liberal project itself:
“We find that there is a central paradox in the neo-liberal understanding of 
politics and the neo-liberal model of the state.  On the one hand, the latter is 
oriented towards an ideal image of the minimalist state whose functions and 
autonomy are supposed to be tailored towards enforcing global business norms.  
A state that accepts and conforms to the rules of the world market needs to be 
readily replaceable and completely interchangeable; it must exist in a relation 
of competition with as many states of the same ilk as possible and it must have 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
social development indicators such as life expectancy, infant and maternal mortalities, adult literacy, and primary 
and secondary school enrolment.  In fact, in 1996 Cuba was ranked in the top 20 percent of all countries, including 
those countries considered the most highly developed.  Additionally, other than the social indicators that are 
associated most closely with food shortages or lack of imported medicine, most social indicators have consistently 
improved since the early 1990s, though at a less rapid pace than during the previous four decades167.
The general explanation for this seeming anomaly is that Cuba has continued to meet its population's most 
basic needs in spite of its economic woes.  The Cuban Revolution prided itself most on improving education and 
health, and eliminating absolute poverty.  During the economic crisis, public spending on social programmes was 
maintained despite a 15 percent cut of total state expenditures.  To put this in perspective, in the late 1980s, social 
expenditures constituted about one third of Cuba's GDP.  In the 1990s, social expenditures constituted about two 
fifths of the GDP.  
This is not unique to Cuba.  Gosta Esping-Andersen, in her book Welfare States in Transition, argues that 
of all the advanced welfare states, “only a few have undertaken radical steps to roll back or deregulate the existing 
system.  All, however, have sought to trim benefits at the margin or to introduce cautious measures of 
flexibilization.  As we have seen, those following a more radical liberalization strategy do better in terms of 
employment but suffer a high cost in terms of inequality and poverty.  In contrast, those resilient to change pay the 
price of high unemployment” (Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. Welfare States in Transistion: National Adaptions in Global 
Economies. London: Sage Publishing, 1996.)  
168 Castells, Manuel. The Rise of the Network Society. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1996.
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internalized the neo-liberal world market regime institutionally, as it were.  On 
the other hand, though, market deregulation and the privatization of public 
services cannot be achieved by a weak state.  What is called for, instead, is a 
strong state, as the legal systems that conform to the needs of global business 
have themselves to be sanctioned by states and established in opposition to 
resistance within society169.”
Perhaps it is feasible, then, to posit Mbeki’s stance within this neo-liberal understanding 
of the model of the state.  There is little doubt as to why a neo-liberal economic model was 
appealing to Mbeki – seeking rapid economic growth for South Africa (and subsequently 
recognition within the global economy) was most certainly a factor.  However, though the 
economic reforms of GEAR drastically cut social spending, making it appear logical to seek out 
non-governmentally funded partners to step in and address social needs, Mbeki and his 
administration did just the opposite – on almost every level, they refused to consult or cooperate 
with non-governmental actors (seek Chapter 1).  
While the ‘denialistic’, ‘institutional’ and ‘economic’ explanations are all plausible and 
certainly help elucidate a portion of the confusing story as to why the government has failed to 
adequately address the AIDS epidemic, none of them sufficiently addresses the issue as to why 
the government has been so hostile toward non-governmental actors and non-governmental 
responses to the epidemic.  In order to explain this, then, perhaps it is necessary to examine the 
issue within the broader arena of state-civil society relations170.  Helen Schneider (2002) argues, 
this, suggesting that within the context of a budding post-Apartheid South Africa, it is highly 
plausible that the conflict surrounding AIDS actually represents a significant yet tacit battle 
between governmental and non-governmental actors over the question of who has the right to 
speak about, define, and determine the response to AIDS171. 
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The struggle for legitimacy
State/non-state partnership
Amid a complex political environment, the AIDS epidemic has continued to be a 
devastating reality for the impacted individuals.  Therefore, despite the fact that there has been a 
high level of political contestation involved in AIDS policy-making and implementation on the 
governmental level, non-governmental actors and civil society have continued pushing forward.  
In South Africa, both domestic and international non-governmental actors have in many ways 
been seeking to fill the void left by inadequate government response.   Non-governmental actors 
have gone a long way in leading the fight to provide treatment for HIV to populations unreached 
or deliberately ignored by government policies. The South African civil society movement, 
which was born largely out of the civil society movement that successfully helped bring down 
the Apartheid government, and led by the internationally-connected TAC, has garnered a large 
amount of ‘power’ through building legitimacy with the public and utilising powerful domestic 
and international networks to bolster their positions.  Rooted in a human-rights rhetoric the civil 
society movement has gone a long way to ensure that treatment is provided to persons living 
with HIV and AIDS.  However, the role of civil society and non-governmental organisations and 
their perceived power have in many ways challenged governmental authority on matters 
regarding AIDS, and who has the right to define what is the best way to respond to the epidemic.  
Within this context, it is possible to explain the high levels of conflict and defensive 
manoeuvrings by the government with regard to non-governmental actors, which in turn could 
explain the perpetuation of the crisis of implementation that has clogged the path toward a more 
humane response to the epidemic.
South Africa should have an endless amount to gain by collaborating with the 
international AIDS regime and streamlining its approach to addressing the epidemic (especially 
if the reason that they have been unable or unwilling to provide treatment or fund large-scale 
prevention campaigns has been because of limited funding or resources). Collaboration between 
non-governmental organisations and the government would seem to be especially strategic:
NGOs possess many positive characteristics that complement the work of 
governments in AIDS care.  While governments have largely focused on the 
public health/epidemiological approach, NGOs have put more emphasis on the 
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broader social approach to AIDS care, by “addressing the social processes and 
inequalities driving the epidemic and intensifying its effects.”  NGOs have 
been able to inspire trust among their constituents, while also encouraging
processes of participatory decision-making.  NGOs are more willing and able 
to address sensitive issues such as how to negotiate sexual relations and how to 
eliminate sexual coercion which are both necessary to reduce vulnerability to 
HIV transmission.  International NGOs also have an added strength of not only 
lobbying Northern governments, foundations, pharmaceutical companies, and 
the United Nations system, they are also able to collaborate with community 
based local organizations to put into effect bottom up strategies for community 
empowerment172.
There are in fact several examples of how a solid relationship between the government 
and civil society can lead to an effective response against the AIDS epidemic in Africa.  
Uganda’s government, under the leadership of Museveni, is the most often cited as being 
exemplary in drawing together coalitions of NGOs, civic associates and governmental 
programmes in an endeavor to redress the impact of the epidemic173.  Policy-makers in South 
Africa seemed intent to follow suit with the drafting of the 1997 White Paper for the 
Transformation of the Health System in South Africa174:
It is recognised that HIV/AIDS cannot be prevented without addressing the 
socioeconomic factors which underlie its spread. The cause and impact of 
AIDS extends beyond the health sector, requiring the commitment of and 
intervention by a variety of sectors - the State, private sector, nongovernmental 
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organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs)… The 
following [principle] will therefore be adopted for the control of HIV/AIDS in
South Africa: 
 Civil society and the Government sector will be involved mutually in 
containing the spread and impact of HIV/AIDS175.”
Shortly after the formation of the TAC in 1998, it looked as though a healthy partnership 
was going to be established between civil society (led by the TAC) and the state.  In the mid-
1990s, the South African government passed the Medicines Act that allowed for parallel 
importing and compulsory licensing of medicines used to treat HIV.  At this point, hopes rose 
that the government would be a source of leadership regarding the fight for access to affordable 
medications.  The TAC and the government, temporarily putting their differences aside in a 
collaborative move, became involved in a drawn-out legal battle over AIDS drug patents and the 
importation of cheap generic ARVs with international pharmaceutical companies.  Together, the 
South African government and the TAC executed a highly successful global media campaign, 
and were able to garner support from a wide international public.  The result was a huge success 
- the Pharmaceutical Manufacturer’s Association was forced to bring down their prices and allow 
developing countries to manufacture generics176.
However, the elation over the partnership was short-lived.  Despite the assertions of the 
White Paper, and despite the fact that it was specifically listed in the National AIDS Plan as an 
important area of focus, cooperation and collaboration between governmental and non-
governmental actors with regard to AIDS policy has been characterised much more by discord 
than harmony within South Africa.  NGOs The AIDS policy arena has been littered with 
conflictual relations between governmental and non-governmental actors, as was discussed in 
Chapter 2.  One policy analyst described the relationship between the two groups as “in a world, 
hostile177.”  To explain this phenomenon, Schneider’s (2002) asserted that the AIDS policy 
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process in South Africa can only be fully understood when seen as a part of a perpetual struggle 
between various power-wielders178.
A struggle for capital
At the African Development Forum in 2000, it was put forward that there are three areas 
of power for political leaders in dealing with AIDS: by exerting influence through formal state 
systems, by creating and sharpening discourse, and by supplying moral authority about the 
epidemic179.  In South Africa, it is possible to argue that all three areas of state power have been 
undermined.  First, the unique political environment of South Africa (such as the structural 
weaknesses of the state bureaucracy inherited from Apartheid and the unequal independence of 
the quasi-federal system) has weakened the ability of political leaders to ensure that policies are 
implemented180.  Second, attempts by the political leadership to shape discourse about AIDS in 
South Africa have been mired in controversy and resulted in a loss of credibility surrounding the 
issue, rather than a sharpening of the discourse.  Issues such as the Sarafina II debacle and the 
Virodene scandal have undermined faith in the governmental response, and President Thabo 
Mbeki’s policy of ‘AIDS denialism’ has been arguably the most significant controversy to 
burden the South African government during the post-Apartheid period.  Instead of shaping the 
discourse surrounding the epidemic, however, Mbeki’s questioning led instead to a backlash 
from the media and civil society groups.  Instead of considering his message regarding the 
underlying socioeconomic issues that have to be addressed in order for AIDS to be 
comprehensively addressed in Africa (such as poverty, inequality and a high STI prevalence), 
domestic and international observers focused on the fact that Mbeki had solicited advice from 
widely discredited AIDS dissidents and refused to fund initiatives such as providing AZT to 
prevent mother-to-child HIV transmission.  And Third, the moral authority of the government 
has been deeply weakened by the backlash surrounding controversial governmental choices 
surrounding AIDS policy, such as openly questioning the connection between HIV and AIDS, 
challenging the use of the antiretroviral drug AZT, soliciting advice from AIDS denialists, and 
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finally refusing to make AZT available for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission181 or 
HAART available to persons living with AIDS.  Because of this, the state’s ability to provide 
moral authority regarding the epidemic was deeply undermined.
Despite the lack of successful state response, the AIDS epidemic has engendered such 
strong responses from a wide variety of actors both locally and globally, and both domestic and 
international non-governmental actors have been seeking to fill the void left by inadequate 
government response.   In contrast to the overall failure of the South African state in wielding 
political power with regards to the AIDS epidemic, non-state actors in South Africa have been 
quite successful in wielding significant power.   This power has been acquired through building 
legitimacy with the public and utilizing powerful domestic and international networks to bolster 
their positions:  
Underlying the power of non-governmental actors is their access to both 
cultural and social capital, generated by the linking of multiple social 
dimensions and spaces: marginalized gay men and township youth; middle 
class expertise and popular mobilization; individual and broader social and 
economic rights; activists and scientists; the North and the South; the national 
and the international.  In the literature on social capital, ‘bridging’ networks 
such as those commonly found in the AIDs field, are considered to be 
particularly effective forms of resource mobilization.  These social networks 
have been facilitated by physical networks of electronic communication and 
vastly increased access to informational through the internet…. Also important 
have been: alliance building with internationally ‘credentialed’ groups such as 
MSF, winners of the Nobel Peace Prize; active support from an independent 
local media, seeing in AIDS an opportunity to call the new state into account; 
and finding concrete targets for short term mobilization182.
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As mentioned previously, it would seem that the power wielded by non-state actors 
should be to the benefit of state – if non-state actors aid (or even replace) the state in responding 
to the epidemic, it would relieve at least a part of the burden of responding to a difficult and 
costly problem.  However, if we view relative power of non-state actors with regard to having 
the ability and resources to address the AIDS epidemic within the larger context of state power, 
it becomes clear that the accumulated power of non-state actors poses a challenge to the South 
African government at its core.  
In order to understand this power struggle, we can examine Pierre Bourdieu’s typology of 
capitals.  Bourdieu places heavy emphasis within his works on the idea of capital, and extends 
the concept of capital to all forms of power, believing that individuals and groups both draw 
upon cultural, social and symbolic assets in order to uphold and enhance their relative positions 
within the social world183.  Bourdieu usually refers to four different generic ‘forms’ of capital: 
economic (monetary resources), cultural (institutionalised by educational qualifications), social 
(made up by social ‘connections’ and institutionalised by titles of nobility)184, and symbolic 
(legitimation)185.  Within the modern world, economic capital, cultural capital (which usually 
manifests in the form of educational credentials) and social capital (which usually manifests in 
the form of networks) and symbolic capital have all become sources of power186.  In terms of the 
state, then, Bourdieu sees the accumulation of capital as a means of constructing a space in 
which its power can be utilised:
“The state is the culmination of a process of concentration of different species 
of capital: capital of physical force or instruments of coercion (army, police), 
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economic capital, cultural or (better) informational capital, and symbolic 
capital.  It is this concentration as such which constitutes the state as the holder 
of a sort of meta-capital granting power over other species of capital and over 
their holders.  Concentration of the different species of capital… leads indeed 
to the emergence of a specific, properly statist capital which enables the state 
to exercise power over the different fields and over the different particular 
species of capital… It follows that the construction of the state proceeds apace 
with the construction of a field of power, defined as the space of play within 
which the holders of capital (of different species) struggle in particular for 
power over the state, i.e., over the statist capital granting power over the 
different species of capital and over their reproduction…187.”
The link between the ideas of capital and the concept of policy-making is not hard to 
make.  According to Bourdieu, resources become capital when they become objects of struggle 
as resources that are valued188.  Governments are the traditional providers of services to its 
citizens, and policy is a tool through which those services can be provided.  In turn, these 
services become a form of ‘capital’ for the government.  Bourdieu views one of the key areas of 
state power to be that of controlling the manner in which its citizens conceptualise and reproduce 
the world and the world’s problems: “One of the major powers of the state is to produce and 
impose (especially through the school system) categories of thought that we spontaneously apply 
to all things of the social world…189”  In the case of South African AIDS policy, then, the object 
of struggle would be the right to decide how to respond to the AIDS epidemic.  If we agree with 
Bourdieu’s typology, the struggle over this legitimacy to respond to the epidemic is the struggle 
over symbolic capital.  Essentially, in the presence of an active civil society that contains a 
number of educated citizens who are able to connect via networks with civil society and non-
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governmental organisations all over the world, and who claim the authority of knowing the best 
manner of response to the AIDS epidemic, the government of South Africa finds itself vying for 
symbolic capital, or the legitimacy to decide what to do about the epidemic.  The struggle over 
who gets to decide the response to AIDS is actually a fundamental struggle for power.  
One commentator suggests: “The act of policy-making is a moment of social violence, 
because ‘to describe something as “policy” is to give it special significance190.  If we use Max 
Weber’s famous definition of the state as the, ‘monopoly of violence,’ this view of policy-
making becomes even more poignant.  Bourdieu concurred that the state claims the monopoly of 
the legitimate use of both physical and symbolic violence191, but viewed the state’s monopoly 
over violence as successful only if it effectively triumphed over its domestic competitors:  “the 
state could not have succeeded in progressively establishing its monopoly over violence without 
dispossessing its domestic competitors of instruments of physical violence and of the right to use 
them…192”.  Though in this instance he was referring to the physical monopoly of violence, it is 
not difficult to expand the concept to include the dominance over the policy arena, thus 
conquering the legitimacy, or symbolic capital with regards to the problem.  In the case of South 
African AIDS policy, the government’s ‘domestic partners’ would the power-wielding non-
governmental actors who hold the symbolic capital with regards to the AIDS epidemic.  
With this understanding of the policy environment representing a much larger struggle 
for power, it is possible to explain the perplexing conflicts that have taken place between the 
state and non-governmental actors, which in turn could explain the perpetuation of the crisis of 
implementation that clogged the path toward a more humane response to the epidemic.  The role 
of civil society and non-governmental organisations, and subsequent accumulation of power, 
have in many ways challenged governmental authority193 on matters regarding AIDS by 
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challenging who has the right to define the best way to respond to the epidemic.  It is possible to 
argue that this is especially true within the unique situation of South Africa, where governmental 
authority to respond to the epidemic has been undermined on a variety of levels (see above). 
Schneider argues that it is this struggle in South Africa that has been responsible for the nearly 
complete non-accommodation and highly publicised disagreement between senior African 
national Congress (ANC) politicians and an entire range of non-governmental actors regarding 
the AIDS policy process194.  Because the public debate on AIDS in South Africa has been 
dominated by competition between state and non-state actors to set the agenda for AIDS in South 
Africa, Schneider argues that both Presidential and Ministerial state interventions on AIDS can 
be viewed as countering efforts by the scientific and activist communities to influence policy.
Conclusion
Within the South African context, the power of the governmental leaders has been 
challenged significantly.  To complicate matters further, non-governmental actors have 
sidestepped infrastructural constraints by eliciting support from international donor agencies, 
wielded incredible power in shaping the discourse surrounding AIDS, and through organisations 
such as TAC, with its strong links to widely respected institutions such as MSF, have provided a 
sense of moral authority.  In short, non-governmental actors are giving the government a ‘run for 
its money’ in regards to the power and legitimacy to deal with AIDS.  However, like Helen 
Schneider argues, the state is not even necessarily united in its response, especially when 
considering President Mbeki’s positions.  For example, the growing number of resources being 
allotted to HIV and AIDS and the decision by certain provincial-level governmental officials to 
defy national policies with regards to the use of ARVs are both signs that a degree of political 
and bureaucratic independence have been present.  Consequently, contestation within the state 
has added significantly to the position (and power) of non-governmental actors195.
Though Bourdieu’s typology of capitals may shed light on what it is that the state and 
non-state actors are struggling for in regards to AIDS Policy, it doesn’t address why some
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members of the government chose to question AIDS science and challenge the international 
consensus on the best ways in which to respond to the epidemic, while other members of the 
government chose to align themselves with a more mainstream view.  Chapter 4 will discuss this
‘why’ in further detail, with reference to the context in which the members of the government in 
South Africa are seeking to respond to the epidemic in the first place.  
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Chapter 4 - Policy Contestation
To summarise the discussion so far, the government of South Africa has been unable to 
implement policy in such a way as to quell the growing AIDS epidemic within its borders.  
Chapter 2 provided a narrative of the conflict-ridden history of AIDS policy in post-Apartheid
South Africa, and Chapter 3 sought to explain several of the key areas of policy confusion and 
conflict by framing it within the larger struggle for power between the government and non-
governmental actors.  While this political power struggle interpretation is useful in explaining the 
conflict within the AIDS policy environment in regards to the conflict between government and 
non-governmental actors, it does not explain contestation that has occurred within the 
government itself, or why the government has produced policy that it then has refused to 
implement.  In other words, how did it get to the point where governmental and non-
governmental actors were approaching the same problem with different solutions in the first 
place?  Or, more specifically, why would Mbeki and his followers put themselves in the position 
where they had to struggle with scientists and AID activists in the first place?
There has been a great deal of discord within the government over the best way to 
respond to the epidemic.  After all, the national government, though represented widely as a 
unitary actor, is comprised of individuals, and each of those individuals is working and creating 
policy within the context of his or her own particular identity and understanding of the world.  
For example, while President Mbeki and his Health Minister publicly questioned the very cause 
of AIDS and the efficacy and toxicity of AIDS treatment, other members of the government196
and former President Mandela came out to publicly express support for the international 
biomedical consensus for addressing the disease.  At the same time that the Health Minister has 
advocated nutrition as the best way to treat AIDS, other members of the Department of Health 
have continued to purchase and distribute millions of condoms and focus on the rollout of Highly 
Active Anti-retroviral Therapy (HAART) in state sponsored clinics197.  The national government 
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has been at odds with individual provincial-level governments about how best to address the 
AIDS epidemic a number of times.  In short, it seems that there is no consistent message coming 
forward from the various sectors of South African government; even within various departments 
of the government, words and actions do not seem to match up.    As was outlined in the Chapter 
2, the result has been that huge amounts of jumbled and sometimes contradictory policies have 
been produced, some of which contradict the AIDS regime and instead reflect the influence of 
AIDS dissident advisors.198    
This chapter will attempt to make sense of this apparent policy-confusion among 
governmental policies and procedures and examine a possible explanation as to why there seems 
to be so little consensus within the government about how to best respond to the epidemic.  
While the last chapter focused upon the conflicts within the AIDS Policy arena with special 
attention to the divisions between civil society and the government, this chapter will focus more 
specifically upon the specific paradigms that different members of the government have ascribed 
to in order to both make sense of the epidemic and to choose the way in which they believe that 
the state should respond.   Specifically, the debate between the mobilization/biomedical and 
nationalist/ameliorative policy paradigms will be referenced.  The mobilization/biomedical 
paradigm emphasises societal mobilisation, political leadership, and anti-retroviral treatments, 
whereas the nationalist/ameliorative policy paradigm focuses on poverty, palliative care, 
traditional medicine and proper nutrition199.  
Competing Paradigms
Despite the fact that within the ANC there have been different opinions over a great 
number of issues related to HIV and AIDS such as condom marketing, notifiability, whether 
outreach programmes should focus on sex workers, and so on, two rather distinct competing 
policy models are possible to distinguish.  The first will be referred to as the 
mobilization/biomedical paradigm, and the second will be referred to as the 
nationalist/ameliorative paradigm.  Author Anthony Butler describes the distinction as follows:
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A social mobilization and biomedical paradigm, advanced by the medical 
establishment and campaign groups, argued for more declarative and clear 
national political leadership, the mobilization of all social resources to combat the 
epidemic, the introduction of publicly funded post-exposure prophylaxis for rape 
survivors and health professionals, and the use of ARVs to prevent mother-to-
child-transmission as a centrepiece of prevention policy.  Supporters of this 
paradigm were later at the forefront of demands for a drastically scaled-up public 
ARV treatment programme.  
A second model, ascendant within government after 2000, focused on sexually 
transmitted infections (STI) treatment, behaviour change, condom marketing, a 
mass communications strategy, and life-skills education.  The emphasis within 
this paradigm was on prevention and palliative care, with nutrition, traditional 
medicine, massive social grants provision, and anti-poverty programmes 
prioritized, while bolstered traditional leaders were given responsibility for 
reinforcing the cohesion of rural communities200.
Importantly, these two policy paradigms are not fundamentally inconsistent with one 
another.  It is not difficult to imagine an adherence to both a commitment to provide ARVs to 
those who need it while concurrently focusing on prevention of further transmission by 
addressing such issues as poverty and the epidemic of sexually transmitted diseases.  However, 
as Butler alludes, in South Africa, especially during the first half of the Mbeki administration, the 
nationalist/ameliorative paradigm, which largely discounts ARV treatments as an option for 
people living with AIDS in the country, was by and large the one adopted as policy.  
Concurrently, aspects of the first paradigm, such as a scaled-up ARV treatment programme
(including providing AZT to HIV positive expectant mothers), were largely and often angrily 
disregarded.  Though there is a good chance that leaders may have been concerned that an
entirely biomedical approach to addressing HIV and AIDS would take attention away from vital 
issues that have been seen to be endemic in Africa such as “extreme poverty, poor sanitation and 
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nutrition, dysfunctional families, a lack of recreational facilities, sexual promiscuity, and high 
crime rates201,” it just doesn’t seem likely that this concern would lead governmental leaders to 
go as far as to completely discount ARV treatments as an option for people living with AIDS.  
Moreover, a high amount of conflict has occurred between supporters of the two different policy 
paradigms, most likely because adherence to a specific paradigm is underpinned by different 
fundamental assumptions about the very nature of the HIV and AIDS challenge and the role of 
the government in addressing it202.
In his book AIDS, South Africa, and the Politics of Knowledge (2007) Jeremy Youde 
posits that the divide in adherence to distinct policy prescriptions has arisen because different 
key governmental leaders have been influenced by different (and often contradictory) knowledge 
paradigms or epistemic communities.  Youde defines an epistemic community as “a network of 
scientists and experts to whom policy makers turn for guidance and unbiased information when a 
new issue emerges203.”  In turn, policymakers use this information in order to create appropriate 
governmental responses to the issue.  This means that members of an epistemic community 
actually wield a considerable amount of power as they are the ones who are framing the entire 
issue at hand for not only the politicians, but in many cases, the public.  According to Youde, the 
concept of an epistemic community was first introduced to international relations scholars by 
Peter Haas.  Haas argues that power is granted to the epistemic community because the 
information they provide is supposedly impartial and objective.  The scientists and experts that 
make up an epistemic community are supposedly apolitical, and therefore policymakers are more 
likely or willing to adhere to what the epistemic community says.  There are a great number of
examples of an epistemic framing a particular issue such as on global warming, pollution, and 
the regulation of space satellites204.
However, a limitation is that this concept of the epistemic community put forward by 
Haas assumes that there will only be one epistemic community that emerges on any one issue205.  
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When examining the stances taken by many of the members of the South African government 
surrounding the issue of AIDS, it is clear that while some policymakers have gathered and 
adhered to advice from the epistemic community surrounding AIDS206, some also have sought 
advice from what Youde terms a ‘counter-epistemic community.’  In the case of AIDS in South 
Africa, the epistemic community has been that of the ‘mainstream’ international AIDS regime –
highly respected scientists and academics from around the world who hold views that fall much 
in line with the mobilisation/biological model discussed above, or that of the ‘AIDS Science’ 
discussed in the introduction.  It follows the basic scientific orthodoxy regarding HIV and AIDS:
The human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infects individuals through the 
exchange of bodily fluids, generally transmitted through sharing needles for 
intravenous drug use, sexual intercourse, or breastfeeding.  Once infected, the 
virus gradually weakens the person’s immune system by attacking the T-cells 
that fight infection.  With HIV attacking the T-cells, those cells cannot then 
fend off other opportunistic infections.  Once a person loses enough T-cells, 
they are clinically diagnosed with AIDS.  Most scientists believe that HIV 
causes AIDS, that AIDS is incurable, and that the disease is ultimately fatal in 
all instances207.  
The counter-epistemic community208, on the other hand, is also comprised of a number of 
scholars and scientists who – contrary to much popular opinion – are generally highly qualified 
in their field and many of whom hold prestigious positions in various academic and scientific 
institutions.  However, members of the counter-epistemic community offer a fundamentally 
divergent or ‘dissident’ understanding of AIDS, and suggest an entirely different set of policy 
prescriptions than does the epistemic community:
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“AIDS dissidents share their own causal beliefs, challenging the established 
orthodoxy at almost every turn….Members of the counter-epistemic 
community generally deny that HIV causes AIDS. …They argue that not all 
who have AIDS are HIV-positive, and that some who are HIV-positive never 
develop AIDS…In essence, they disagree with all of the arguments made by 
mainstream AIDS epistemic community209.”
The counter-epistemic community therefore frames the AIDS issue in an entirely 
different manner, focusing within a socio-economic rather than biomedical paradigm, couching 
suggestions about AIDS policy in terms of a burgeoning democracy and struggles against 
oppression, appealing strongly to the identity of many South Africans, and identity that has been 
formed by decades of less than positive experiences with outside public health campaigns and a 
desire for a distinct voice on the international stage210.
Putting it in perspective: Thabo Mbeki and AIDS “denialism”
Before moving forward, it is important to take a step back and examine more carefully 
how governmental leaders policy choices are drastically affected by the specific context of South 
African politics and identity.  Or, more specifically, it is important to discover why some South 
African leaders would be drawn away from a more ‘mainstream’ biomedical view of AIDS and 
attracted to eliciting advice from a counter-epistemic community.  Because of the huge publicity 
surrounding his views and the importance of his position as president of the nation from 1999-
2008, Thabo Mbeki will be used as an example of a South African leader who became 
influenced by the counter-epistemic community. 
President Thabo Mbeki’s policy of ‘AIDS denialism’ – which is a name associated with 
Mbeki’s choice of words and actions regarding the HIV epidemic - has been arguably the most 
significant controversy to burden the South African government during the post-Apartheid
period.  As was discussed in Chapter 2, from 1999 through 2003, Mbeki questioned the 
international scientific consensus that HIV was the casual link to AIDS, and voiced concern that 
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multinational pharmaceutical companies, in conspiracy with Western scientists, were purposely 
exaggerating the claims about the incidence and prevalence rates of HIV and AIDS in order to 
sell overpriced and unaffordable drugs.  He also suggested that anti-retroviral (ARV) drugs were 
toxic to South African patients, and that instead of using Western medicine, that the AIDS issue 
should be considered part of the ‘African renaissance’, where African people may discover and 
African cure for an African problem.211
  In large part due to the publicity of these controveries, Mbeki’s views and the views of 
members of his cabinet (specifically his Health Minister), were widely criticised within South 
Africa and internationally notorious for the approach their views took in addressing HIV and 
AIDS.  President Mbeki’s questioning of the biomedical causes of AIDS in large part baffled 
both national and international audiences inside and outside of the medical fields, and 
governmental decisions  to deny funding for treatment programmes such as the Mother to Child 
Treatment Prevention Programme drew wide criticism from non-governmental organisations 
committed to human rights.  However, when put into the perspective of South Africa’s 
problematic history with racialised health care, Mbeki’s stance is - if not justifiable - much easier 
to understand.   
Racism and conspiracy are nearly impossible to extract from South Africa’s history, most 
especially in the realm of public health.  As has been documented a number of times, colonial 
medical discourse about Africans was extremely sexualised, especially regarding the spread of 
STIs.  In Colonial discourse, African sexuality was depicted as “primitive, uncontrolled and 
excessive, and as representative of the darkness of the continent itself.”212 As early as 1900, the 
bubonic plague was used as an excuse to remove hundreds of black South Africans from their 
homes in Cape Town to the first of the ‘native homelands’ under a law that had been passed in 
1883 called ‘The Public Health Act.213’  It should therefore be no surprise that when AIDS 
appeared in South Africa, it was interpreted from nearly all angles through a racialised lens.  The 
disease has been described often by academics, politicians and civil society in terms of African 
sexuality and promiscuity214.  During the Apartheid era, some white leaders even went as far as 
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to publicly rejoice over the fact that a disease could wipe out black people.215  As has been 
shown through testimonials that were publicised during the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, during the last years of Apartheid, National Party leaders were developing 
chemical and biological weapons (such as anthrax) to assassinate black leaders, researching 
sterilization techniques to use on the black population in order to stymie population growth, and 
even attempting to purposely spread HIV through the black communities by strategically 
‘planting’ HIV infected prostitutes216.
This historical narrative is very evident in Mbeki’s statements about AIDS.  One of the 
most upsetting examples of the dehumanising legacy of Western science in Africa was the fate of 
Sarah Baartmann, whose legacy Mbeki addressed in a speech given in 2002 on the occasion of 
the return of Sarah Baartmann’s remains to her home in South Africa.217  In the 1800s, 
Baartmann, a Khosian woman, had been kidnapped from her home in Cape Town and was taken 
to England and France to be displayed with little clothing as a ‘freak.’  Scientists in Europe used 
her to affirm the grotesque stereotypes of African sexuality at the time.218  The symbolism of her 
funeral in the current AIDS debate is highly important because it served as a poignant reminder 
of the monstrosities performed on African bodies in the name of Western science.219  Speaking in 
the Eastern Cape to crowds between a reported 5000 - 7000 people, Mbeki said:
The story of Sarah Baartmann is the story of the African people of our country.  It 
is a story of the loss of our ancient freedom…It is a story of our reduction to the 
status of object that could be owned, used and disposed by others.’220
Though he never specifically referenced AIDS during his speech, the implications were clearly 
there.  His rhetoric was a warning to any that were hoping to forget the past of racial oppression.
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A racialised interpretation of public health in South Africa is not only understandable, but hard to 
avoid.  It is imperative to therefore consider Mbeki’s statements and actions, which show an 
Africanist, anti-colonial ideology, as well as a desire to ensure that Africa is not ‘blamed’ for a 
sexually driven epidemic221  with this historical perspective in mind.  Some authors, such as 
Raymond Downing, take this argument even further, saying that not only do we need to keep in 
mind South Africa’s racialised past with health care, but we have not given Mbeki enough credit, 
and that the way he has been portrayed in the media, especially the Western Media, has been 
unfair and inaccurate.  Downing recounts a May 22, 2000 interview on The News Hour (in the 
United States) with Jim Lehrer in which Mbeki defended what he believed about the HI virus:
The interviewer Gwen Ifill asked, “…You’ve said that you were mischaracterized 
in some of the comments you said about the relationship between HIV and 
AIDS…Exactly where do you stand with that now do you think?”
Mbeki responded, “Well, yes, I don’t know where these reports came from, that 
we’re taking a position saying there’s no connection from HIV - between HIV 
and AIDS.  I never said it…”  She then asked about his opposition to AZT, and he 
told her his reasons: “Affordability, medical infrastructure in order to dispense 
these medicines, and potential toxicity.”  In the same interview he explained why 
he invited the dissident scientists, explained again the difference between the 
African and American epidemics, and explained his desire to confront AIDS 
together with all the other health problems facing South Africa.222
Downing uses examples such as these and many others to argue that Mbeki has been 
misrepresented in the media, and how his statements need to be contextualised within the 
specific rhetoric of African medicine.  It has to be taken into consideration that Mbeki raised 
very valid points about the socioeconomic and political factors contributing to the scale of the 
South African AIDS epidemic, points that have been largely overshadowed by the perception 
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that he was an AIDS ‘denialist.’  Take for example, Mbeki’s remarks in July of 2000 at the 
Durban AIDS conference (see Chapter 2).  
However, Mbeki also did not officially deny the link between HIV and AIDS, and the 
ruckus definitely detracted from the message that he was conveying: that underlying 
socioeconomic issues have to be addressed in order for AIDS to be addressed in Africa:
As I listened and heard the whole story told about our own country, it seemed 
to me that we could not blame everything on a single virus.  It seemed to me 
also that every living African, whether in good or ill-health, is prey to many 
enemies of health that would interact one upon the other in many ways, within 
one human body.  And thus I came to conclude that we have a desperate and 
pressing need to wage a war on all fronts to guarantee and realize the human 
right of all our people to good health.  And so, being insufficiently educated, 
and therefore ill-prepared to answer this question, I started to ask the question, 
expecting an answer from others, what is to be done, particularly about HIV-
AIDS!  One of the questions I have asked is ‘are safe sex, condoms and anti-
retroviral drugs a sufficient response to the health catastrophe we face?’223
Though Downing’s defense of Mbeki may be too forgiving, it is too simplistic to argue 
that Mbeki’s arguments are simply irrational.  When put in the historical context of South 
Africa’s experience with racialised public health, as Didier Fassin argues, Mbeki’s views and 
statements clearly echo a narrative of political resistance to white domination and to the global 
order in general, as well as claim alternative treatments and interpretations of the disease based 
within the spirit of the African Renaissance224.  The basis of Mbeki’s argument has been that 
instead of simply relying on the conventional Western biomedical discourse surrounding AIDS, 
we should instead work on a discourse that addresses the socioeconomic realities of South 
Africa.  As mentioned previously, he has stated a number of times that AIDS is a disease of 
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poverty, and that it is poverty, not AIDS, that is the world’s biggest killer225. This argument 
focuses on the social conditions that make the spread of an epidemic likely, rather than on the 
behaviours that spread the disease.  As Youde points out:
If Mbeki is approaching AIDS from a socioeconomic perspective rather than a 
biomedical one, then some of his positions make more sense.  Addressing 
AIDS is less about providing ARVs and more about fundamentally 
restructuring the international economic order.  It is a problem of poverty and 
underdevelopment, not just sick bodies, and needs to be holistically addressed 
from that perspective226.
  
This is a valid point.  While proponents of a biomedical paradigm are correct in asserting 
that certain behaviours place people at high risk of contracting the disease, it is also irrefutable 
that certain economic and social conditions put people in a situation where they are more likely 
to choose those risky behaviours in the first place, as they lack the economic or social resources 
to make decisions that may keep them at lower risk of the disease227.  This discourse, which is 
imperative to understanding and quelling the spread of HIV, is one that Mbeki perceived and 
took up.  And it is arguable that the strong and vehement renunciation of his views limited the 
discourse on the other side to too narrow of a biomedical or behavioural approach.  As Fassin 
and Schneider argue: “Had a social epidemiology of HIV been more prominent in the scientific 
arena, rather than the dominant biomedical and behavioural approach, Mbeki might have found 
an interesting alternative to the explanation of the epidemic given on the dissidents’ websites228.”  
As it stood, however, Mbeki’s views were harshly criticised by the medical epistemic 
community, sharp lines were drawn, and AIDS became a central part in the attempt to shape a 
distinctly South African identity.  Mbeki’s consideration of a dissident view of HIV AND AIDS 
                                                          
225 Youde “The Politics of Knowledge”, 91.
226 Ibid.
227 Ibid, 92.
228 Fassin and Schneider, “The politics of AIDS”, as quoted in Youde “The Politics of Knowledge”, 92.
70
and the creation of a Presidential panel that was made up of nearly half dissident scientists would 
put him in the camp of being influenced by the ‘counter-epistemic community.’  
If we take Youde’s theories on epistemic communities to be true, it becomes much easier 
to decipher the competing sets of policy prescriptions discussed above:  In South Africa, a 
counter-epistemic community of experts has been allowed to gain influence within the 
governmental policy-making process because it offers a framing of AIDS that is in line with 
several policymakers’ nationalist desires and identities.  This counter-epistemic community 
provides advice and recommendations about policy from a fundamentally different place than 
does the epistemic community.  However, not all members of the government have fallen in line 
with this counter-epistemic community.  On the contrary, many governmental players are quick 
to cooperate and seek advice from the epistemic community (see Chapter 2), and thus align 
themselves with the international AIDS regime, which also frames the AIDS issue through the 
epistemic community.  Because of the existence of two strongly competing frameworks, the 
policy that has been created has come from two fundamentally different paradigms.  When 
policy from one paradigm has been formulated, because it is not supported at even the most 
fundamental levels by key leaders of the government who frame the issue from the competing 
policy paradigm, it becomes hopelessly jumbled in a conflict-ridden policy environment.
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion
The stance of former President Mbeki and his allies regarding HIV and AIDS has been 
widely condemned.  Though it is too simplistic to simply argue that their views are irrational, it 
is also imperative to take into consideration the implications of their stances on policy-making 
and subsequently, on the lives of those affected by HIV and AIDS.  It would be understandable 
if, as Fassin and Schneider (2003) argue, widespread distrust of Western medicine, science, and 
public health still remain deeply imbedded in the consciousnesses not just of the governmental 
leaders, but also a large percentage of the population.  However, some authors, such as Mandisa 
Mbali (2002) suggest that most within South African society recognise that a racist discourse 
surrounding AIDS is increasingly in the past.  A racialised interpretation of the current AIDS 
epidemic, at least in the way Mbeki has articulated it, is reacting to a largely extinct racist 
discourse, which saw Africans as inherently pathological229.  
Mbali argues that when Mbeki contends that Western biomedicine regarding AIDS aims 
to stigmatise African sexuality and appeals to non-specific ‘African’ solutions to the epidemic, 
he is essentialising the notion of ‘African culture’ in the first place, and assuming that it has been 
completely and permanently altered by Western culture (through the means of colonisation).  
This, continues Mbali, is an archaic argument in today’s world and surrounding today’s 
epidemic.  Mbali argues that Mbeki’s rhetoric about AIDS has gone back in time to argue against 
a discourse which in today’s world has been largely surpassed by “rights-based, anti-
discrimination discourse and a shift to a medical, technical non-‘moralistic’/stigmatising 
approach.”230  In other words, Mbeki’s policies and arguments are challenging an anachronistic 
identity that the international community has already taken great strides to move beyond – “the 
contemporary response is appropriate for a previous conceptualisation of the disease231”.  While 
Mbali may be a little overly-optimistic about the philanthropic nature of all ‘Western’ medicine, 
she delivers a clear point when she says that regardless of the arguments against the racist nature 
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(past or present) of AIDS discourse, it is the job of the president to provide health services to the 
population of his country.  This gridlock caused by questioning the science of AIDS is 
inexcusable as people need treatment.  
This argument has been taken up and carried quite vociferously by the Treatment Action 
Campaign, as well as a large portion of civil society.  As articulated in the Mail and Guardian in 
2000:
Faced with this crisis, we can legitimately expect of our president that he ensure 
that state policy on the issue is coherent well-understood by the public at large, 
energetic and based on the best available scientific knowledge…Instead, he has at 
times behaved like someone trying to be the Boy’s Own basement lab hero of 
Aids science.  He has allowed his attention to be diverted by abstruse debates on 
immunology and related science…In the process, the nation’s attempt to deal with 
this national health crisis has been plunged into confusion.  And the four million-
odd South African who have contracted the syndrome can be forgiven for feeling, 
if not exactly abused, certainly neglected.232
Perhaps this viewpoint is most graphically depicted by looking at the numbers.  Nicoli 
Nattrass takes a quantitative approach to exploring what ‘could have been’ if there had not been 
a ‘stalemate’ regarding AIDS policy, and the government’s choices had been different.  She uses 
the ASSA2003 demographic model in order to explore this question by modeling different policy 
scenarios.  The baseline of the model looks at the “reality” – or the outcomes that occurred using 
the ARVs, prevention and treatment.  The four other projections look at what could have 
happened if any one of the strategies had not been in place, one with no intervention at all.  As is 
apparent by looking at Figure 3, interventions using ARVs for both prevention and treatment 
helped probably about a quarter of a million more people from becoming infected with HIV than 
if no interventions had been implemented.233  
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However, Nattrass’ argument is that this achievement could have been much greater if 
national political will had been similar to the political will in the Western Province, which was 
the only province that has remained in control of the opposition in the post-Apartheid era, and 
has defied national policy by starting a HAART project in conjunction with Medecins Sans 
Frontieras (MSF) in 2000234.  There is a fifth projection on Figure 3 that shows the estimate of 
the impact on new HIV infections if MTCTP had been rolled out in 1998 instead of in 2001, and 
if HAART had been rolled out throughout the country at the same time that the Western province 
rolled it out.  This model indicates that more than 171,000 new HIV cases could have been 
prevented if this had been the case235.
Figure 4 repeats this same exercise, only with AIDS deaths, and the model estimated that 
an additional 343,000 AIDS deaths could have been prevented by implementing HAART and 
MTCTP at an early date.  Figures such as these have lead Nattrass and other authors to accuse 
the South African government of ‘genocide by sloth.’236
Figure 3 ‘New HIV infections: different scenarios (ASSA2003 demographic model)
237
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Figure 4 'AIDS deaths: different scenarios (ASSA2003 demographic model)
238‘
Nattrass’ argument illustrates the potentially devastating effect of a policy environment 
that is inundated in conflict and contradiction: Though the inequalities within South Africa were 
institutionalised by the Apartheid regime, which set the scene for the AIDS epidemic, the current 
scale of the AIDS situation cannot simply be contextualised in terms of the past.  As was learned 
from Apartheid, policies matter.  We already know that current social factors, which can be at 
least in part contributed to neoliberal policies such as increased unemployment, migration of 
women in addition to men, declining marital rates and growth of informal urban areas are 
perpetuating inequalities239.  This ‘high risk situation’ in South Africa is compounded by a policy 
environment that has been mired by both conflict and contestation, and consequentially, even the 
most lauded of AIDS policies have not been properly implemented.  The result has been that the 
AIDS epidemic in South Africa has not been in any substantial way quelled by the government.
This thesis sought to examine possible explanations for the high levels of conflict and 
contestation regarding AIDS policy in South Africa.  Through an examination Bourdieu’s 
typology of capitals and a reconceptualisation of AIDS policy within the framework of a larger 
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struggle for power and legitimacy within the specific context of post-Apartheid South Africa, a 
possible explanation was put forward for the high levels of conflict between government and 
non-governmental actors: the struggle over AIDS policy has actually become a struggle over 
symbolic capital, or legitimacy.  However, in order to explain contradiction regarding AIDS 
policies that has occurred within the government (or why the government has produced policy 
that it then has refused to implement), the framework through which policy-makers are 
influenced was explored.   The theories put forward by Anthony Butler and Jeremy Youde offer 
an explanation of competing policy paradigms and in turn, how those have been adopted by key 
governmental members and formulated into policy.  With fundamentally different frameworks 
shaping the policy that is being put forward, it is of little surprise that there has been a great deal 
of confusion and prevarication taking place.  
Perhaps what is most tragic about the counter-epistemic (or denialist) messages that were 
put forward and supported by the government during the early 2000s is not that it depicted a 
resistance to the racist and colonial histories of Western medicine, or that it critiqued 
neocolonialism, multinational companies and even NGOs.  Instead, the tragedy lies in the fact 
that unlike figures such as Paul Farmer and Susan Sontag, both whom passionately used 
arguments about poverty and racism to amplify the dire need for AIDS treatment in the 
developing world, Mbeki’s statements and like thoughts (as articulated in the ‘Castro Hlongwe’ 
document) used anti-colonial and anti-racist rhetoric to stall the application of ARVs.240 As 
Youde aptly points out:
While Mbeki may have this different interpretation [regarding the paradigm 
through which to view AIDS], there is no reason to assume that it is an 
either/or issue.  A restructuring of the international economic order may indeed 
provide greater equity and justice, but that does not mean that those sick bodies 
here today should be sacrificed for a goal that is perhaps even more 
overwhelming than the AIDS epidemic241.
                                                          
240 Wang, “AIDS denialism”, 7.
241 Youde “The Politics of Knowledge”.
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What is clear is that the government certainly did not take as aggressive of a stance as it 
could have.  This is understandable in light of the racist history through which South Africa has 
come.  However, though it may be understandable, it is not excusable, and this must be kept in 
mind by the current and future governments.  The tragedy of the past does not excuse inaction in 
the present.
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